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Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, ) is, 
) CASE NO. CV0700728 
Defendant/Petitioner, 1 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
VS. ) DISPOSITION UNDER 
) I.C. s19-4906(~) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent 
State of Idaho, who pursuant to I.C. 919-4906(c) moves the Court for Summary Disposition on 
the pleadings filed herein as there are no genuine issues of material fact and Respondent is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The basis of said request is as follows: 
1. Counsel filed appropriate proposed jury instructions and made the appropriate 
legal arguments. &e, Exhibits "C", "D" and "E" attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
2. The Courts jury instructions 201A, B, C, D, E, and F are adequate instructions on 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION UNDER I.C.§19-4906(c) 1 
H:\MOTlON.ORD\rnckay motsumdiswpd 
the law as it relates to the crime of Felony Vehicular Manslaughter. &, Exhibit 
"B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. The Courts instructions 201A is substantially the same as the pattern vehicular 
manslaughter instruction in I.C.J.I. 709, and actually puts a HIGHER burden on 
the State than the pattern instruction. Under I.C.J.I. 709, the State's burden is to 
show that the defendant's conduct "was a significant cause contributing to the 
death" of Ted Cox.. &, Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
this reference. The Court's instruction required the State to prove that the 
defendant's conduct was THE CAUSE of the death of Ted Cox. The Court's 
instruction was, thus, of a benefit to Petitioner as it required a higher burden of 
proof to be met before the jury could convict. Counsel's argument to the jury 
focused on that higher burden, as well as upon the instruction on act and intent 
(201F). Ineffective assistance of counsel can not be predicated upon conduct of 
counsel that benefitted the Petitioner. As given, Instruction 201A contains an 
express element as to "causation' which is greater than that required by the 
statutory language of I.C. $18-4006(3)(b) and I.C.J.I. 709. 
4. The Court record and transcripts in CR032 1789 support a finding that trial 
counsel was constitutionally adequate and competent and that Petitioner was 
afforded a fair trial through counsel's assistance. 
5. Petitioner's citation to State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 (Ct.App. 
2005) is inappropriate. A charge of Felony Vehicular Manslaughter under I.C. 
$ 18-4006(3)(b) does not include a negligence standard, but is premised upon 
causing someone's death while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol, i.e. "other culpable behavior". Furthermore, the Court and counsel were 
both aware of I.C. $18-1 14 and LC.J.1. 305 on the "union or operation of act and 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION UNDER LC.$ 19-4906(c) 2 
H: \MOTION.ORD\~IC~~~  motsumdis.wpd 
intent." &, Instructions of the Court, 201E, and Defendant's Proposed 
Instructions. The jury was adequately instructed on the element of causation and 
intent. 
Oral argument is requested. 
29- DATED this -day of January, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for 
Summary Disposition Under I.C. 9 19-4906(c) was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, 
Boise, Idaho 83'702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this ~ ~ a n u a r y ,  2007. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITlON UNDER I.C.9 19-4906(c) 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay motsumdis.wpd 
3 
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*- 
.i ICJI 709 VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular 
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant [name], while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of [description of misdemeanor or 
infractionl [driving while under the influence of alcohol]; 
[andl 
[4. the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence; 
and] 
[41 [51. the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in 
such unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to 
the death of [name of decedent (s) I . 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of [insert 
description of misdemeanor or infractionl [driving while under 
the influence of alcohol1 is committed when all of the following 
are found to exist: 
[Insert elements from statute or other instructions] 
If the state has failed to prove any of the above, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If you unanimously find that the 
state has proven each of the above, including each component of 
the unlawful act of [insert description of misdemeanor or 
infractionl [driving while under the influence of alcohol] 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
Comment 
I.C. § 18-4006. 
The committee chose to use the term "unlawful act," rather than 
"crime," in paragraph number 3. An infraction could constitute 
the offense that gives rise to the vehicular manslaughter 
charge. Infractions are criminal offenses. State v. Bennion, 112 
Idaho 32, 730 P.2d 952 (1986) . 
This first alternative paragraph number 4 should be used only 
when the defendant is charged under IC § 18-4006(3) (a). See ICJI 
342 for definition of "gross negligence." 
[Revised July 20051 
dbOQ)SL40 
EiIibi*' 1 
CANY@I\l CGlJNT CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF M 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CASE NO. CR-03-21789-C 
-vs- ) 
) INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
SHANE MCKAY ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 101 
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you 
what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be 
doing. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to 
reach your decision. 
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening 
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has 
presented its case. 
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge against the 
defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the 
defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is 
evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence. 
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the 
law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given time 
for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to help 
you understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not evidence, 
neither are the closing arguments. Alter the closing arguments, you will leave the 
courtroom together to make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with 
you my instructions, the exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in 
court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 102 
This criminal case has been brought by the state of Idaho. I will sometimes refer to 
the state as the prosecution. The state is represented at this trial by a deputy prosecuting 
attorney, Virginia Bond and Gearld L. Woiff. The defendant, Shane Mckay, is 
represented by Richard L. Harris. The defendant is charged by the state of Idaho with a 
violation of law. The charge a g d  the defendant is co~tained in an Information. The 
cIerk shall read the Information and state the defendant's plea. 
The Information is simply a description of the charge; it is not evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 103 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presumption of innocence means two things. 
F i  the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that 
burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his or her innocence, 
nor does the defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt bared on reason 
and common sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary person hesitant to 
act in the most important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence 
you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 104 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions 
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state 
the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding 
others. The order in which the W c t i o n s  are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before 
you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful 
pertormance by you of these duties is vital to the administtation of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. 
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by 
rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a 
witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked 
to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed 
to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I 
sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer the question 
or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have 
been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a 
particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or rely 
on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which 
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will 
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any 
problems. Your are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from 
time to time and help the hial rn more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct 
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to 
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole 
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you 
attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with 
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday 
affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should apply 
in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more 
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the 
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness 
had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on 
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consi&r the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
LNSTRUCTION NO. 105 
If during the trial I may say or do anything, which suggests to you that I am inclined 
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, 
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of 
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard 
it. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 106 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject 
must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty 
to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 107 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you 
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury 
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear 
other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury 
room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and 
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one 
person the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 108 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following 
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during 
the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not talk about this case either among yourseIves or with anyone eke during 
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or 
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have 
heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final 
arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is 
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do no let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does 
talk about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they wont stop talking, itport that to 
the bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors 
about what has happened. 
Third. during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any 
witnesses. By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to 
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured of  the fairness they rn 
entitied to expect from you as jurors. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside 
of the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an 
explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, dictionaries, 
encyclopedias or any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do 
SO. 
Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or 
television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented 
in court and not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have 
happened. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to 
the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some 
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the 
rules, you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a d e  or law different from any I 
tell you, it is my instruction that you must follow. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201A 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, as charged in the 
information, the state must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about the 5Ih day of October, 2003, 
2. in the state of Idaho, Canyon County, 
3. the defendant, Shane McKay, drove or was in actual .physical control of 
4. a motor vehicle 
5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the 
public, 
6. while under the influence of alcohol 
while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of 
defendant's blood, 
7. and the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201B 
The phrase .'actual physical control." means being in the driver's position of the 
motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201 C 
The term "highway" means the same as "street" and includes public roads, alleys, 
bridges and adjacent sidewalks and rights-of-way. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201D 
To prove that someone was under the influence of alcohol, it is not necessary that 
any particular degree or state of intoxication be shown. The state need only show that the 
defendant had consumed sufficient alcohol to affect the defendant's ability to drive the 
motor vehicle. 
INSTRUCTiON NO. 201 E 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date, If 
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that 
precise date. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201 F 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act 
and intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201G 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be 
considered for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 201 H 
You have heard the testimony of Tina Hoover concerning a statement made by 
Mike Warren before this trial. The believability of a witness may be challenged by 
evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement that was not 
consistent with the witness' testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be 
considered by you only for the purpose of deciding whether you believe Mark Warren's 
testimony. This evidence of an earlier statement has been admitted to help you decide if 
you believe Mike Warren's testimony. You cannot use these earlier statements as 
evidence in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2011 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to 
testify. The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and 
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt From the fact 
that the defendant did not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your 
deliberations in any way. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 206 
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those 
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts hrn all the evidence 
presented in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists oE 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence. including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What 
they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is 
included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts 
as you remember them differ ffom the way the lawyers have stated them, 
follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been 
instructed to disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 207 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of 
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
The arguments and statements of the attomeys are not evidence. If you remember 
the facts differently h m  the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your 
decision on what you remember. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are 
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the 
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your 
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and 
declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before 
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of 
the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the 
law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations. you each have a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest 
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw 
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a 
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellowjwors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or 
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the 
jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 208 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to 
reach a verdict. Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your 
determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of 
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an 
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 209 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They 
are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on 
them in any way. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific 
instructions. There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there 
is, you should not concern yourselves about such gap. 
MSTRUCTION NO. 21 1 
Upon retiring to the jury room. select one of you as a presiding juror, who will 
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that 
the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has 
a chme to express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the 
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court. 
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considerjng all of the insiructions in their entirety, and after having N l y  
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate 
with me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how 
the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are instructed by me to do so. 
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you 
with these instructions. 
DATED This a of o & ,. 2003 
RICHARD L. HARRIS 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1438 
1023 Arthur 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1 588 
Fax: (208) 459- 1300 
ISB No. 1387 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 CASE NO. CR-03-21789 
Plaintiff, 1 
VS. 
) 
) DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
1 JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant by and through his attorney and submits 
their proposed Jury Instructions and Respectfully request this Court to consider said 
instructions in instructing the jury in this action. 
DATED: This day of October, 2004. n 
Exhibit 
008168 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
I the undersigned do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was served on the following this a day of October, 2004. 
DAVID L. YOUNG United States Mail 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse Hand Delivered 
1 1  15 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 Facsimile 
006)16;9 
DEEh'DANT'S PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTIONS - 2 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol is committed when all of the following are found to exist: 
1. That on or about October 5, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle; 
4. Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property 
open to the public; 
5. While under the influence of alcohol and/or who has an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine 
or breath. 
If you Find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
CbOO170 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
ICJI 709 
Instruction No. 
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or 
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of 
others. 
ICJI 341 
Instruction No. 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and 
intent or criminal negligence. 
I.C. 18-114 
ICJI 305 
Instruction No. 
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption 
places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against 
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant 
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore, if after considering all of the 
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty. 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of 
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say 
they feel an abiding conviction, to a morai certainty. of the truth of the charge. 
ICJI 103 
Instruction No. 
You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his 
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to the 
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to hi guilt. 
State v. Holiier, 1100 Idaho 129,594 P.2d 639 (1979) 
State v, Hwnphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000) 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any 
vehicle which does not contain those parts or is not at all time equipped with the 
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is 
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho 
Code. " 
A violation of the statute is negligem. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motorcycle and every motordriven cycle shall cany at least one 
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a 
height of nat less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and 
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from 
all distances within three hundred fiftv (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the 
vehicle when directly in front of lawful u& beams of head~lam~s." [I.C. 49- 
m 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Nothin herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle &-ears or older 
of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to ex& one (1) inch 
in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps othenvise comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 49-906." 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp 
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light 
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall 
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than 
twenty (20) inches. [I.C. 49-9061 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
The term "negligencen refers to a lack of that attention to the probable 
consequence's of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to 
the person's own affairs. 
ICJI 341 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant. Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner c a d  the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the 
influence of alwhol is committed when all of the following are found to exist: 
1. That on or about October 5,2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle; 
4. Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property 
open to the public; 
5. While under the influence of alcohol andlor who has an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine 
or breath. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
Q00181 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
Instruction No. 
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or 
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of 
others. 
Instruction No. 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and 
intent or criminal negligence. 
Instruction No. 
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption 
p law upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against 
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant 
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore. if after considering all of the 
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty. 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to 
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of 
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say 
they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
Instruction No. 
You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his 
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to the 
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any 
vehicle which does not contain those parts or is not at all time equipped with the 
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is 
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho 
Code. " 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motorcycle and every motor-driven cycle shall carry at least one 
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a 
height of not less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and 
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from 
all distances within three hundred fifty (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the 
vehicle when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps." [LC. 49- 
9071 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
'Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years or 
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to ex& one (1) 
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 49-906." 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
IDJI 2.22 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statue in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Every motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp 
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light 
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall 
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than 
twenty (20) inches. V.C. 49-9061 
A violationof the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
The term "negligence" refers to a lack of that attention to the probable 
consequences of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to 
the person's own affairs. , 
Instruction No. 
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the 
occurrence in question which provided that: 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years o r  
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1) 
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the 
requirements of I.C. 49-906. " 
A violation of the statute is negligence. 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted 
limit but without gross negligence; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
ICJI 709 
Instruction No. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2003; 
2. In Canyon County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle 
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted 
limit but without gross negligence; and 
4. the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Theodore Cox. 
If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then 
you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
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MR. HARRIS: Judge, if it please the 
Court, I have submitted to the Court this morning after 
the evidence has been presented an instruction on 
vehicular manslaughter that is an instruction that 
would activate subpart (c) of the vehicular 
manslaughter statute. 
And I offer the instructions on this 
basis. The State has charged under part (b), which is 
a felony. There is evidence under the record that 
Shane McKay may well have operated this vehicle with a 
BA less than .08. Because of the differential in the 
time that the BA was taken and the time of the 
accident, the jury could well find that that didn't 
auulv. , ,  , 
The jury could find, because of the 1:; speed issues that were presented in evidence of this 
18 m~ I.-L=: -ON c o r n  P R Q S = ~ ~ ' S  ~ 1 ~ s  
By: Virginia B ~ n d  
19 G.Eld I. Wolff 
canyon Covnty Courthou.. 
20 1115 Albany Street 
Do.r Ofcia. Bax 668 
I 1/25 - We have talked brieflv about cause, and 
17 case, that the unlawful act which triggers the 
18 culpability could be the infraction of a speed greater 
19 than the speed limit, which would then bring into 
  ~ - .~~ --.-
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20 operation the misdemeanor section of the statute, so 
21 the evidence would support the misdemeanor instruction. 
22 And it seems to me that the manner in which this case 
23 has been charged would also give the Court authority 
24 for the giving of this instruction. 
3 
4 (Counsel for respective 
5 parties present, along with 
6 the defendant.) 
7 
8 ********** 
9 
10 THE COURT: All right. We're taking up 
11 State vs. McKay outside the jury presence. I have been 
12 meeting with the attorneys regarding proposed final 
13 instructions, and I had caused to be delivered 201, a 
14 verdict form, through instruction 211. I was also 
15 provided with a proposed instruction drafted by the 
16 defendant with regard to a lesser included of 
17 misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. 
18 I'll take up at this time first with the 
19 State. Mr. Wolff, do you have objections or concerns 
20 regarding the instructions or the verdict form? 
21 MR. WOLFF: Judge, on the packet of 
22 instructions that you have provided to us, no, I do not 
23 have any objections. 
24 . THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
25 Mr. Harris. 
the dilemma is what to do about cause. And I have 
essentially taken the position that cause is something 
that I'm not requesting a jury on this morning, but 
it's certainly part of the dilemma. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Wolff. 
MR. WOLFF: Your Honor, under 
Mr. Harris's theory and under the statute as alleged, 
there is either, A, no lesser included under the 
vehicular manslaughter as we have charged under 
subsection (b), or there are two lesser includeds, both (a) and (c), felony vehicular manslaughter with gross 
negligence under the interpretation of the facts that 
Mr. Harris wants to give. I wanted to make a record of 
that. 
He's talking about the speed and only 
the soeed. He's not talkino about the crossina over of 
the double yellow line at ttie railroad track to - 
oncoming traffic and running into the back of the 
motorcyde proceeding down the roadway in his lane of 
travel. That's gross negligence. I f s  reckless to 
cross the double yellow or to uoss over a centerline 
at a railroad track, That's the statute. That's the 
reckless di i ing statute. 
So there is more than enouoh evidence to 
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to obviously the statute, vehicular manslaughter. 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice, and vehicular can be committed in three 
different ways, (a), the commission of an unlawful act 
not amounting to a felony with gross negligence, and 
(c), the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to 
a felony without gross negligence. 
The State did not elect to charge under 
(a) or (c). They chose instead to charge under (b), 
the commission of a violation of Section 18-8004 or 
8006. In this case, they elected the driving under the 
influence under 8004. 
I also looked specifically how Idaho 
defined gross negligence. Essentially, gross 
negligence is such negligence as amounts to wanton, 
flagrant, or reckless disregard of the safety of 
others. 
And Mr. Harris has offered this 
instruction. I believe that I am preduded from giving 
it because this proposed misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter instruction can only be a lesser included 
under (a) of the statute. In other words, it can only 
be a lesser included because it would be less than 
gross negligence. (A) is with gross negligence. (C) 
is without gross negligence. 
i a 
APPEAL AUGMENT 
1 support the lesser included of felony vehicular 
2 manslaughter as much as there is to support a 
3 misdemeanor manslaughter without gross negligence. 
4 That's not how we have it charged. We 
5 have this charged as subsection (b), under the 
6 influence andlor, in the alternative, with a BAC over 
7 -08. There's sufficient evidence in the record. 
8 Mr. Harris wants to attack the BAC, but if you remember 
9 Officer Woolery --excuse me -- Officer Marek's 
10 testimony at the point when she made contact with Shane 
11 McKay at the scene within 1415  minutes of the 
12 accident, her opinion was that he was under the 
13 influence of alcohol, so that fact is right there at 
14 the scene. 
15 Judge, we have charged under subsection 
16 (b), We don't believe there is a lesser included of 
17 misdemeanor manslaughter on the charge or the facts 
18 that you have presented to you. Mr. Harris wants to 
19 nitpick each and every fact here, and using his theory 
20 and logic, every criminal case would have some type of 
21 lesser included, and that's not the law. Lesser 
22 includeds are those offenses that come from the main 
23 charge that are factually supported by the charge and 
24 for which there's legally sufficient basis for a 
25 finding of guilt. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 He can't have it both ways. I f  he has a 
2 lesser included, it's felony vehicular manslaughter 
3 before they even reach the misdemeanor vehicular 
4 manslaughter. We don't believe that it's appropriate 
5 for a lesser included. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
7 The Court has given a lot of thought to 
8 whether the giving of a lesser included offense could 
9 be given or the jury could be instructed to consider. 
10 And in doing so, I went back and looked at the two 
11 analyses for the consideration of lesser included. 
12 A lesser included offense is one which 
13 is necessarily committed in the commission of another 
14 offense or, one, the essential elements of which are 
15 charged in the Information as the manner or means by 
16 which the offense is committed, and that's State versus 
17 McCormick, 100 Idaho 111,1979, and ICR 31(c). 
18 Having considered both ways to look at 
19 this, I always have to go back to the Information in 
20 this case, which specifically charges that Shane McKay 
21 did unlawfully, without malice, kill Ted Cox by 
22 operating a motor vehicle in the commission of a 
23 violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004 under the 
24 influence of alcohol in this case, 
25 So in analyzing this, I further go back 
17 
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1 I agree that in their cross-examination 
2 of the State's experts that they may have raised --the 
3 defense may have raised the issue and it was admitted 
4 that Shane McKay's BAC could have been less than '08 ai 
5 the time that it happened, so thars going to have to 
6 be an argument that's made to the jury. 
7 And as I see it, we're left with the one 
8 instruction and the one verdict form, so I'm going -- 
9 the instruction will be preserved for appeal that was 
10 proposed, and I'm ready to instruct the jury as I 
11 proposed in the instructions. 
12 Mr. Harris, did you have any other 
13 concerns you wanted to raise about the verdict or the 
14 instructions? 
15 MR. HARRIS: Judge, just one other 
16 comment. I understand the CouKs ruling and will 
17 accept that ruling for purposes of this morning. But I 
18 probably -- and I just need to clarify m record on 
19 this, and that is that, as I understand 4 at statute, 
20 it talks in terms of an unlawful act that caused the 
21 death. 
22 The first one is an unlawful act not 
23 amounting to a felony with gross negligence. The 
24 second one is an unlawful act, meaning the DUI or being 
25 under the influence. The third one is an unlawful act 
19 
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1 not amounting to a misdemeanor --yeah, a misdemeano 
2 not a felony, but without gross negligence. And so as 
3 I read these three statutes together, it becomes an 
4 included offense because we're talking about an 
5 unlawful act in each event. 
6 They've elected to charge under one 
7 felony statute, and the unlawful act could be the 
8 misdemeanor. They could find without gross negligence, 
9 which would bring into play number three. 
10 But I undwstand the Coufs ruling and 
11 we will proceed from there, Judge. 
12 THE COURT: All right. At this time, 
13 then, we'll go ahead and have the jurors brought down 
14 and we'll proceed with final instructions. We are in 
15 recess. 
16 
I7 X*$******* 
18 
19 
20 
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10 MS. BOND: Good morning, ladies and 
11 gentlemen. First of all, let me start off by telling 
12 you how much we greatly appreciate your time, your 
13 attention, and your presence here. Without that, we 
14 couldn't work this great system of justice that we all 
15 are within, and we're proud of it. So on behalf of 
16 mvself and Mr. Wolff and the prosecutor's office, we 
17 think you. 
18 Let me draw your attention to one thing 
19 as I start opening argument here. Notice, if you will, 
20 that I have never used the term "accident" during this 
21 presentation of the case, and there's a reason for 
22 that, because this case was not an accident. This case 
23 is a situation of willful conduct, This is choices 
24 that were made by an individual, and these choices 
25 resulted in the death of someone's loved one, and 
-- 
accountability is the factor, 
In  this particular case, the person who 
made those choices is Shane McKay. He made the choice, 
number one, to consume alcohol. He made the choice, 
number two, to drive an automobile. And he made the 
choice, number three, to drive that automobile in a 
reckless and careless manner taking the life of Ted 
cox. 
This is no accident, This is a wreck. 
This is a collision. This is a crash. This is what 
we're here about today and what we've all spent the 
last four days covering as evidence. 
The State does have the burden of proof 
as always, and the State has to prove certain things. 
And to prove certain thinss, we have presented facts 
through testimony here. "You must weigh and determine 
which of those apply and basically decide what happened 
in this case. 
Let's go over those elements first. 
This is kind of what I call the building blocks of our 
case, First of all, the State must prove that this 
crime occurred on or about October 5th) 2003. Several 
people have talked about that, police officers, Mike, 
Monique. 
That this crime occurred in Canyon 
23 
County, state of Idaho. Police officers again, I t  
happened behind the Lowe's. Yes, that's in Canyon 
County, state of Idaho. 
Number three, that Shane McKay drove or 
was in actual physical control. He admitted it, 
admitted it to Tonna Woolery. 
Motor vehicle, the Cadillac that is 
sitting over at the shop that you saw. 
And this happened upon a highway, 
street, bridge, or property open to the public. 
Several officers testified about, that that's a road 
they travel every day. Ed Robertson, for one, told you 
about that road and the contour of i t  specifically. 
And under the influence of alcohol, 
four, over .08. 
These are the building blocks of this 
particular case, and I've gone over some of the facts 
that you've heard in court through the testimony that 
support that, So once you realize, of course, that 
this is not an accident, the way that we start with 
looking at i t  is the first person that we heard 
testify, Steve Wood. 
Steve didn't know these folks that were 
coming in front of him. He looked up. He was driving 
that road with his kids in the pickup and saw two 
-- - 
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1 lights, He thought first it was a car. No, it's too 
2 wide. Those are motorcycles, So he had his window 
3 open, He looked out and admired the motorcycles going 
4 by him, and he looked up and saw a car halfway in his 
5 lane, 
6 He was crossing the railroad tracks the 
7 bikes had just crossed. He saw this car coming at a 
8 high rate of speed and swerved back into the other lane 
9 heading toward K-mart, and he thought he doesn't have 
10 room, there's not enough room, Just as he thought 
11 that, he heard the crash, saw the dirt fly. The 
12 tremendous noise that accompanied this crash woke his 
13 little girl up, 
14 He pulled over to the side of the road 
15 and called the police as Monique ran toward him 
16 frantic. He didn't go back to the scene, but his 
17 impression of this was very dear in that he saw the 
18 motor vehicle coming, it was on the wrong side of the 
19 road going back into the other lane, and heard the 
20 crash. 
21 And remember, I asked him if he had any 
22 background in edimating speed, and his estimate was 60 
23 miles per hour. So when you look at the facts that 
24 Steve purported, they line up with what also Mike and 
25 Monioue testified to. 
Mike and Monique were there. They were 
on the motorbike next to Mr, Cox situated closest to 
the centerline of the road. Mike was also driving a 
Harley-Davidson and Monique was on the back, and her 
job was to check all the taillights and all the 
equipment on the bikes. They had gone to Denny's to 
get the ranch dressing, had gone by the sugar beet 
factory, had come over the overpass to the highway and 
was headed towards Shari's to eat, 
They reported, both of them, that this 
is a hard tail motorcycle. It's got no shocks, so you 
have to go slow over bumpy areas like railroad tracks, 
so they slowed down. As they slowed down, they went 
over the railroad tracks and they both looked over at 
Ted, and he was laughing, he was smiling, making some 
gesture. Suddenly, he was gone. He was gone forever. 
They felt this great rush of wind, and Ted was gone. 
There was parts of metal, There was 
dirt flying in their faces. They never saw it coming. 
They never saw it coming, which might be a clue to 
interpreting what Ed Robertson testified about. 
They pulled the bike over. I t  came to a 
stop. Mike ran over and found his brother, who he 
refers to as his brother, dead, obviously dead. He 
covered him with his leathers and looked over and saw 
the car and somebodv runnina around outside the car. 
He was tremendously! angry. 3omeone had just killed his 
friend, his brother. He went over and he grabbed this 1 
person and he hit him and he put him down on the ground 
by his friend and stayed there holding him until the 
police arrived. 
And when they arrived, the first one 
that came there was Tonna Wwlery, She was a 
relativeiy new officer that came upon the scene. She 
was the first one there, She went over to where Shane 
McKay was, and in her conversation with him, she 
noticed a few factors. 
This is State's 25. She smelled the 
odor of an alcoholic beverage, She saw bloodshot eyes. 
She saw some behavior that concerned, and his speech 
was slurred, the things he was saying, so she made a 
decision that he was perhaps under the influence of 
alcohol and asked him if he'd been drinking. He 
admitted it. He'd been drinking. So when she looked 
at the scene and saw that there wasa deceased there, 
the decision was to take him to the hospital where 
Stephanie Brannan drew blood and Tonna Woolery took 
custody of it and that blood went to the lab. 
Dave Laycock analyzed it, and Dave 
Laycock testified that the blood alcohol content was a 
-7 
.15, which is almost twice the legal limit. Impairment 
at that articular level would match up with the t driving ehavior in this case, according to Ed 
Robertson. 
.15 was within an hour and a half of the 
wreck. Dave Laycock testified that it would take 
approximately seven drinks to get to that point, plus 
some additional ones to keep that level going. So you 
can figure out if he hit Mr. Cox at this particular 
time and the blood came at this particular time, when 
would he have consumed those seven drinks. And the law 
in this case is oerfectlv clear. I f  vou're over a .08. 
you are driving under'the influeice, and if you drive 
under the influence and kill someone, then you should 
be held accountable, 
After Dave Laycock testified, you 
further heard the testimony of Tony Evans. Now, Tony 
Evans came upon the scene after Tonna Woolery. He also 
had conversation with Mr. McKay and told you that he 
smelled alcohol and saw his bloodshot eyes.' Both 
officers saw the same impairment indications. 
Tony made these measurements back here, 
measured from the railroad track, took those pictures, 
and found what he thought was the point of impact. 
State's 18 is that gouge mark in the 
7Q 
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I 1 Davement. This is the issue that Ed Robertson covered 1 
sense, of course, with the diredion the Cadillac 
traveled which ended up right there high-centered on 
with you, this gouge mark and the tire prints that are 
along each side of it. His interpretation was that 
that gouge mark came from the car hitting the 
motorcycle and the motorcycle's back tire stopping and 
that caused the rubber burn, He addressed how the 
motorcycle went sliding down the pavement and ended up 
right where Tony says it ended up, and it should have 
ended up there. 
Ted's body ended up at this point at a 
lesser distance than the motorcvcle, And it makes 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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In  this particular case, the big 
question is was this vehicle out of control, and both 
experts talked about that, Let's think about what Fred 
Rice said first of all. He said he took those 
measurements, he took the photographs, he looked at 
them, he put together the information and provided a 
report which indicated that this was a vehicle out of 
control. I t  was out of control back here, clear back 
here before the railroad tracks, And as it's out of 
control there, it's coming across the railroad track 
leaving those scuff marks. Not tire marks. Scuff 
marks. That shows out of control, 
I t  veers into the lane here, and Ed 
talked about an angle, talked about an angle and, bang, 
it hits into that motorcycle and sends it flying. This 
is an action out of control, You lose control here, 
you overcorrect to go back into your lane, and thars 
what resulted in this impact, Why Mike wasn't hit and 
Monique wasn't hit, it's somebody bigger than us with 
that particular curbing. 
As Tony was there at the scene, he was 
taking measurements from Midland Boulevard, which is 
somewhere out here. He took photographs. He saw what 
he termed as vapor trails. And there's been a lot of 
discussion about those vapor trails. We had a lot of 
education yesterday. I was really confused with the 
math. I hope everybody else was too. 
But those vapor trails and those pieces 
and fragments laying on the roadway are only leading up 
to the point where Ted's body is and that motorcycle 
is, and then there's a big gouge mark right there. 
m 
them that day. 
Ted was. Hopefully, Ted never saw what 
14 
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was coming. The paramedicstold you what his injuries 
were. He had a fractured skull. He had broken bones 
in his arms and legs. He had a broken neck. These 
particular injuries are consistent with the motor 
I n  
vehicle wreck that we've described here, and they 
killed Ted Cox, 
Fred Rice did not do speed based on one 
factor. Fred Rice d ~ d  not do speed based on one 
factor, Fred Rice did speed based on three, the 
Cadillac, the body, and the motorcycle, and he came up 
with approximately the same figures. Conservatively, 
65 miles per hour is the speed he figured, and he had 
the numbers. He even variated the numbers up there on 
the witness stand. These were cold, hard, scientific 
numbers, These aren't guesses and these aren't 
daydreams. These are based upon the measurements of 
Tony Evans out there at the scene. 
And not only did he do it three ways, he 
ended up doing it the fourth way right in front of this 
Court with the splatter information. Remember when he 
dropped his pen and that was like a time-distance 
thing? He put it into the range that I could 
understand of the motor vehicle and how the motor 
vehicle could impact the motorcycle pushing it forward. 
State's 9, this impact right here to the 
rear of the motorcycle is what we're talking about. It 
was a very hard impact. I t  wasn't a little bump. This 
was a smack, a high degree of v e l ~ i t y  which sent the 
Cadillac, the motorcycle, and everything down the road. 
7 ,  
Fred Rice testified that those lio~iids 7 
didn't have time to s ill out until they got further 
down the road, whici is consistent with velocity in 
that cup thing that he showed us. So all that 
testified to is consistent with the facts and the 
measurements that Tony Evans took and is consistent 
with the eyewitness testimony of Steve Wood, Mike, and 
Monique. 
And you also saw this motorcycle, so you 
know how hard it was h i t  This motorcycle was hit so 
hard, State's 10, that Tony Evans had to pull that 
license plate out of the back side of that motorcycle. 
I t  was embedded in there. He didn't even see it at 
first. And that license plate goes to the Cadillac. 
The other thing that Tony Evans found at 
the crime scene, 22 and 23, are pictures of the license 
piate. You can study these more closely when you get 
back in the jury room. And Mr. Paulson showed you how 
the brackets on this attach to the light fixture that 
was affixed to the back of Ted's motorcycle. Three 
people testified they saw that light there that night. 
Mike, Monique, and Mr. Paulson, they saw that light. 
This license plate was aftixed to it. Without the 
light, the brackets of this license plate wouldn't have 
held it in place. 
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1 Ted was very proud of this motorcycle he 
2 called Mumm. He'd had her longer than Mikey's been 
3 alive, and that motorcycle was a big part of who he 
4 was. He went to that shop every Saturday, His friends 
5 rode. This is his fun and his enjoyment, and he took 
6 pride in her, and there's this taillight right there 
7 with his license plate on it. Why would he take that 
8 off? It wouldn't be safe. They check on that for each 
9 other. I t  wouldn't be safe. 
10 Because of Mr. McKay's careless driving 
11 and his choice to consume alcohol, Ted Cox was killed 
12 violentlyy, There's brain matter along the road. There 
13 was brain matter around him and coming out his ears. 
14 He had breakage. He flew through the air quite a 
15 distance. His glove, his glasses, the vest, everything 
16 flew off of him as he was pushed by the weight of the 
17 Cadillac. 
18 Remember, Ed Robertson testifred that 
19 Cadillac probably weighs 4,000 pounds. There's no 
20 pavement that's even going to stop that Cadillac, and 
21 that's what hit Mr. Cox at 65 miles per hour from 
22 behind sending him vaulting through the air. 
23 What about Ted Cox's drinking that 
24 night? It was the last night of his life. He was 
25 visiting friends. He saw his mother. He was, 
71 
1 again as soon as Mr. Harris is finished, but we would 
2 aik you to once again consider all the'facts before you 
3 make a decision. Thank you. 
4 M E  COURT: Thank you, Ms, Bond. 
5 Mr. Harris, you may proceed. 
6 
7 ********** 
8 
9 MR. HARKS: I f  it please the Court, 
10 counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I'm a Cubs 
11 fan, but how about those Red Sox? I wish we were here 
12 talking about baseball rather than what we're talking 
13 about this morning. 
14 This is an unfortunate and tragic 
15 accident. It's tragic to both families and to their 
16 friends. But, ladies and gentlemen, what this is is an 
17 accident. 
18 This is what is known as closing 
19 arguments. It's the time that the attorneys get an 
20 opportunity to visit with you as jurors. What we say 
21 to you is not evidence. I want you to be perfedtly 
22 clear about that, I f  your recollection of the evidence 
23 is different than mine, you rely on yours. I'll not 
24 try to mislead you, but as I've indicated, if your 
25 recollection is different than mine, you know what you 
l r  
1 according to the experts, in his proper lane of traffic 
2 right here. He wasn't swerving. He didn't pull out in 
3 front of Mr. McKay. He was in his proper lane of 
4 traffic. He was drinking, true, but drinking doesn't 
5 involve the death penalty. 
6 Was there any contributing factors I 
7 asked each of the experts. The only contributing 
8 factor was that he was there. This was not his fault* 
9 And Ted had a good life. He shared it 
10 with his loved ones, and they are robbed of him because 
11 of the choices that were made by Mr. McKay, the choices 
12 to consume alcohol, the choices to drive a car, and the 
13 choices to drive that car in a reckless and dangerous 
14 manner. Because of those choices, he killed Ted Cox 
15 and robbed him of life. And for this, he should be 
16 held accountable. 
17 This is not an accident, This is 
18 willful conduct. What you need to do is consider the 
19 facts, the testimony, the blood alcohol content, what 
20 the reconstructionist said, what the eyewitnesses say, 
21 because if you think about it in the big picture, 
22 you11 see what !iteve Wood said about speed and 
23 position and what both the experts said about speed and 
24 position are the same. This was no accident. 
25 I'm going to be able to address you 
74 
need to do. 
Let me talk about this instruction that 
you have received. That instruction lists those six 
items that the prosecutor has put up on that board, but 
unfortunately or intentionally, the prosecutor has 
failed to put one other additional element that is part 
of that instruction, and I'm going to take the liberty 
of putting it on there because as youget that 
instruction in the jury room, you'll notice that there 
is a number seven, and that number seven has the word 
"cause" in it. 
The way the vehicular manslaughter 
statute is written. it is written in the format that 
the driving of the vehicle and the commission of an 
ilnlawf~l act that causes death is a violation of that 
statute. 
In  this particular instance, in order 
for there to be a violation of the statute, you must 
find that Shane McKay drove the vehicle -- we don't 
deny that -- on a highway, That's obvious. It's 
alleged by the prosecution that he was either under the 
influence or had a BA greater than .08 or .08 or 
greater. 
And they stopped right there because 
they take the position that if you do that, you are 
7r, 
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1 guilty. That's not the instruction on the law that has 
2 been given you by Judge Hoff because it contains the 
3 additional word, that must cause the death of Mr. Cox. 
4 There's another instruction that needs 
5 to be talked about briefly, and that is that in every 
6 criminal offense, there must exist the joint operation 
7 of act and intent. And where is the act and the intent 
8 in the evidence that you've received that caused the 
9 death of Mr. Cox? 
10 Let me just address some issues having 
11 to do with evidence in this case. And there's a number 
12 of issues that you'll have to sort out with reference 
13 to the testimony of Mr, Warren, Ms. Crownhart, and 
14 Scott Paulson. There is the issue of the position of 
15 the bikes on the roadway. There is the relationship of 
16 those bikes with each other. 
17 There is the issue of the drinking of 
18 Mr. Cox. You'll remember that they said that he'd only 
19 had one drink, that he was essentially a non-drinker, 
20 and yet, it's not possible under the law or under the 
21 facts that a person driving on the roadway with a ,I9 
22 BA was not a factor in what happened. 
23 But I'm verv well aware of human nature 
24 and I know that friends and, in this case, brothers, 
25 shade the truth. I think Scott Paulson and all said, 
37  
possible that his BA was less than .08. 
He said it would take seven -- I think 
it was seven drinks, I don't know how many of you are 
familiar with drinks. I'm not. I had learned this. 
But supposing he had a Long Island iced tea just before 
he left where he was, that contained enough alcohol to 
get you there, but there's an absorption rate, there is 
an elimination rate. 
And it may have been a ,15 an hour and 
forty minutes after the accident, but as their expert 
says, it could very well have been less than .08 at the 
time of the accident. Ladies and gentlemen, that is a 
reasonable doubt, 
The prosecution wants you also to 
believe that the injuries received in the accident 
caused the death of Mr, Cox, and it seems clearly 
apparent that that's the case. And because it seemed 
apparent to the people in charge of this, no autopsy 
was ordered, 
Ladies and gentlemen, I've been either a 
prosecutor or defense attorney for over thirty years 
and I've handled lots of homicide cases. This is the 
first case that an autopsy hasn't been performed. 
And I'll tell you why an autopsy is 
performed. It's not only to establish cause of death, 
39 
but it's to establish that cause of death to the 
exclusion of every other cause and to establish 
evidence, 
MS. BOND: Your Honor, I'm going to 
object to him testifying about some facts that were not 
in evidence. 
THE COURT: I'II overrule the objection. 
I think he can make his argument. I'II continue to 
entertain that issue if you want to revisit it. 
MR. HARRIS: I don't know if any of you 
watch Law and Order on television, Approximately a 
week ago on that episode of the program, there was a 
situation that occurred -- I didn't see the program, 
but it's been related to me -- that a person, a 
pedestrian, was struck by a car. 
The injuries and cause of death seemed 
clearly evident by what occurred. When they performed 
the autopsy, they discovered a subdural hematoma that 
had occurred as the result of an occurrence some time 
prior, and it was that subdural hematoma that was the 
cause of death, not what appeared to be the apparent 
injuries of the carlpedestrian accident. Ladies and 
gentlemen, that's another element of reasonable doubt. 
I don't know how many of you watch Bill 
O'Reilly and The O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News 
an 
1 you know, we will cover for each other, and that's 
2 going to be important later on in my argument, But 
3 it's your assessment of the credibility of those 
4 witnesses and the assessment of where they say things 
5 were in the entire context or the totality of the 
6 circumstances of this case. 
7 You have heard evidence, and I would 
8 submit to you that Shane was very much traumatized by 
9 what happened. They described him as crying, and the 
10 picture that was put on the screen indicates that he 
11 was clying. It's obvious that his eyes were red. He 
12 had been battered by Warren. 
13 I think he said that -- I think there 
14 was some evidence that while he was crying, he was 
15 praying. He kept repeating it was an accident, I 
16 didn't mean to hit him, he popped out of nowhere, I 
17 didn't see him, it was an accident. He kept repeating 
18 that over and over, 
19 Now, the prosecution wants you to 
20 believe that at the time of this accident, Shane was 
21 under the influence or over the legal limit. And even 
22 though there was a BA of ,IS, as I recall, 
23 approximately an hour and forty minutes after the 
24 accident, the State's expert, the witness they called, 
25 said that at the time of the accident, it's entirely 
38 
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channel, but he describes his program as being a 
no-spin zone, and he uses the word -- a word that I 
learned, I never heard it before then, but he used the 
word "blowvitate," which means, in the vernacular that 
I'm familiar with, don't baffle me with your BS. 
And let me talk about that in context 
with some testimony, And in this particular case, each 
side is represented by an attorney. Each side has had 
expert witnesses come and testify. There's been a lot 
of evidence regarding credentials and qualification and 
that one side's credentials, because they belong to 
organizations, that makes them somehow more credible 
and more important than the other side. 
But to put that again in context, I'm 
licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho but I 
don't beiong to the American Bar Association, I don't 
belong to the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, I don't 
belong to the Idaho Criminal --or the Idaho Lawyers 
for Criminal Justice. Does that make me any less a 
I 20 lawyer qualified to come before ou and represent my 21 client in this case? I am license ( Y .  to oractice before 
22 the courts in the state of Idaho, befdre the federal 
23 courts in Idaho, before the Ninth Circuit, and before 
24 the United States Supreme Court, but I don't belong to 
25 these voiuntaty organizations. 
' i t  
illuminated by the headlight. 
And I agree with him that it takes 204 
feet to stop, but what he did not include in that 
number is some reaction time on the part of the driver 
to perceive and to apply the brake, Once the brake was 
applied, it's 204 feet, but there is a lag time in 
order to get there. That's how facts are massagedand 
manipulated. 
And so I guess what I'm wing to point 
out there is that he's telling the truth as far as the 
truth goes, but the answer is not complete. And 
because it's not complete, it's misleading. The fact 
that there is a reaction time there extends, in that 
instance, the stopping distance by almost a third. So 
instead of stopping at 250 feet within the headlight, 
you stop at 290 feet. 
In addition, I noticed the tendency to 
filibuster, to manipulate information. But, ladies and 
gentlemen, you are the arbiters of their credibility 
and their testimony. 
One of the things about this case that 
has been a puzzle to me for a long time and is a 
disagreement between the State's case and their experts 
and me and my expert, and that has to do with this 
point of impact because that is an important 
dl 
1 Ms. Bond, in the course of the 
2 examination of Mr. Freeman, worked him over about that 
3 affidavit. Unfortunately, I was the one that drafted 
4 the affidavit. And we were in a huny and he signed 
5 it, but that's what happened. 
6 Let me come back and talk about the 
7 exoerts for iust a minute, and oarticularlv Mr. Rice 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 a d  Mr. ~06ertson and some iontradictions in their 
9 testimony opinions. 
10 First, Rice testified that the proof of 
consideration for you as jurors in this case, 
Where is the point of impact? You 
listened to the testimony of Mr. Wood. Mr. Wood 
testified that had the car crossed over his iane, went 
off the left edge of the road and tried to come back, 
there would have been a head-on collision with him. 
You listened to his testimony as he said with reference 
to the car that was coming down in the other lane of 
traffic, it crossed, he believed, the centerline, went 
back into that lane, I t  never did come completely into 
his iane of traffic. And again, on this diagram, if 
that occurred, it would have been much further down the 
road to the east than what is depicted here. He would 
have seen that. He never saw it. He never testified 
8 
9 
10 
11 impact where it is on that diagram over there was 
12 caused by the rim -- the rim of the rear wheel of the 
13 motorcycle. Robertson said it was a cross-member on 
14 the Cadillac. Rice said it was a straight-on 
15 collision, Robertson said it was at an angle. 
16 And they gave a lot of testimony, but 
17 let me tly and give you an example of the subtlety of 
18 the testimony and the ability to massage and manipulate 
19 facts to comport with their formulas and so forth, 
20 Talking about that no-spin zone, you 
21 remember Mr. Robertson talking about a requirement that 
22 a headlight had to illuminate the road 250 feet ahead 
23 and that he used I believe it was 65 miles per hour and 
24 that a car stops in 204 feet and, therefore, he should 
25 have stopped because that is less than the 250 feet 
42 
to it. 
He testified as to what happened, and 
Mr. Rice's comment about his testimony was, well, he 
didn't perceive it correctly, he didn't see what he 
saw. Why is that important with reference to this 
point of impact and why is it important with the 
testimony of the experts that reconstructed this 
accident? 
It's important because the State's 
experts did not reconstruct this accident. What they 
have done is they have taken Officer Evans' -- yeah, 
1 20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
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1 Tony Evans' theory of this case and they have defended 
2 it. And Brant Freeman looked at these same facts and 
3 reconstructed the accident as to what happened. 
4 And you remember -- and I don't remember 
5 whether i t  was Mr. Rice or Mr, Robertson that testified 
6 that reconstruction of an accident is taking all the 
7 pieces of a puzzle, all of the elements that are there, 
8 and putting them together and figuring out what 
9 happened. 
10 Now, that wasn't really what happened 
11 here. What really happened is that they, as experts 
12 for the State, took the theory of this accident 
13 formulated by Mr. -- Officer Evans and defended it. 
14 Brant Freeman took those same facts, totality of the 
15 facts, and in my judgment, determined what really 
16 happened, and this is why. You'll remember during the 
17 course of the trial -- 
18 Could I have Exhibit A, please? 
19 You're going to have this when you get 
20 in the jury room, but during the course of the trial, I 
21 had the witnesses look at this numerous times. And if 
22 you go to page 3 -- page 1 and 2 depict the roadway of 
23 Karcher before vou aet to the railroad tracks and it's 
trail. We're talking about marks. From 220 feet, 
which is from this pointto this point, it's labeled 
rear wheel skid mrirk of motoriycle,220 feet. 
If you listen to Mr. Robertson and 
Mr, Rice, the motorcycle -- when this accident 
occurred, the motorcycle laid right down and skidded 
along the pavement all the way to where i t  came to 
rest. There are no marks for the first 83 feet. There 
should have been marks, and there were none. 
The only thing that can explain that is 
that the motorcycle was airborne for that 83.1 feet and 
finally it landed and then the marks began. That 
contradicts - and it would be impossible in the first 
place because of weight and gravity, but i t  contradicts 
the testimony of Mr. Rice and Mr. Robertson because 
there would have been marks and there were none. And 
then finally, there's another 87 feet where i t  finally 
came to rest from the marks that were put on the road. 
And then we come back to these distances 
having to do with the vapor trail, and those are the 
numbers in the upper right-hand corner of page 2 of the 
exhibit. The distance that they have established on 
these notes is the vaoor trail of the motorcvcle 
got what purpohs t i  be where the Cadillac left tire I I 24 started at 780 feet west, and that is by a p'rocess of left the roadway, came back on the roadway. The second 25 subtraction, if my math is correct. And I don't claim 45 47 I 
/ 1 oaae aaain has the railroad tracks. I t  has the 
I 
,.. . 
2 point -- what Tony Evans alleges the point of impact to 
3 be. And then it has the distances from that point to 
where Mr. Cox was, to where the motorcycle was, to 
where the tire marks first went onto the curb and where 
the Cadillac came to rest. 
And up in the right-hand corner of that, 
you'll also notice the vapor trial of number two, which 
is the Cadillac, vapor trail number one, which is the 
motorcycle. And you'll ail probably remember the 
testimony having to do with those vapor trails or, as 
Mr. Freeman describes it, the liquid debris. 
The third page of this exhibit is 
important for you once you get in the jury room to 
discuss this accident You will notice that at the 
bottom of this exhibit, there is a gouge mark 
purporting to be where the point of impact occurred. 
That gouge mark corresponds with the gouge mark on the 
second page, which is where they allege the point of 
20 impact was. 
Coming back to the third page, this was 
22 measured bv Officer Corder of the ISP and Officer 
23 Evans. ~ r o m  the gouge mark to a point 83.1 feet 
24 downrange from that gouge mark, there are no marks, no 
25 marks. We're not talking about liquid debris or vapor 
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to be the areatest mathematician. but it's 74.5 feet 
from this Goint of impact. The vapor trail of the 
Cadillac starts at 790 feet west, and that number -- 
where have I got it here on my notes -- is 73.5 feet. 
Excuse me, It's 79 feet. 
So how do you put this together? What's 
the meaning of that? The vapor trails and the marks 
correlate very closely. The debris field starts 
downrange from 83.1 feet. That's where the debris was 
found. We know that if the point of impact was where 
they say it is, there would be marks on the roadway by 
both vehicles, particularly the motorcycle, during that 
83.1 feet where they measured. They looked. They 
never found any. 
ThaYs what Brant Freeman was testifying 
about because that has to mean that the point of impact 
is down there where this 83.1 feet, that number is. He 
said that it has to be in close proximity to that 
number. That makes sense to me. 
As you look at the totality of the 
evidence of this case, the theory of this accident 
propounded by Officer Evans doesn't make sense. It 
doesn't make sense for a number of reasons, not only 
the testimony of Mr. Wood, but the marks on the roadway 
as they come across the railroad tracks. 
4R 
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1 And again, that was a puzzle to me 
2 because I believe it was Mr, Rice that said, well, 
3 these are scuff marks, the ones that come from the 
4 eastbound lane into the westbound lane, and they look 
5 identical to the marks that are in the westbound 
6 lane -- or excuse me -- yeah, to the eastbound lane, 
7 but those are not scuff marks, we don't know what they 
8 are, And you look at them and they look identical. 
9 And Brant Freeman testified that he looked at them and I 10 blew the pictures up, looked at them under a magnifying 11 glass and could see no difference. That doesn't make 
12 Sense. 
13 The speed doesn't make sense because 
14 what happens with the point of impact with the State is 
15 you've got to elevate those speeds. X's actually 71 
16 miles an hour, And Mr, Rice hedged a little bit saying 
17 it was 65, but his calculation is actually 71 miles per 
18 hour, I f  he was off the left edge of the roadway, in 
19 1.1 seconds, you've got to cross over across the 
20 railroad tracks and get situated in the westbound lane 
21 of traffic to directly collide with the motorcycle. I 
22 suppose that's possible, but the probability of it, of 
23 that occurring, you know, it just isn't there, That 
24 dwsn't make sense. 
25 Ladies and gentlemen, when you retire to 
1 JV 1- 
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accident -- or excuse me -of the motorcycle at the 
time of the accident. There wasn't any changes. Some 
of those witnesses worked on it, but there weren't any 
changes. That's the way it was. That's the way it 
was. 
And yet when they got to the scene of 
the accident, the only thing that was found therewas 
the license plate, and they took pictures of the 
license Plate. We've aot those ~hotoam~hs ere. Is  
1 the jury room, you bring with you your common sense and 
2 your experience, what makes sense to you. And I submit 
3 that, at least to me, what makes sense is not the 
4 theory of the accident that Officer Evans came up with. 
5 That just doesn't make sense to me at all. 
6 If Brant Freeman is correct and the 
7 point of impact is downrange from where they got it to 
8 the close proximi of 83.1 feet, that significantly el' 9 reduces the spe of the vehicles. That is reasonable 
10 doubt. 
11 A number of years ago I was in a trial, 
12 and I thought the case was one of those slam-dunk 
13 cases, there isn't any way in the world that you can 
14 lose it, And I was taught a lesson by a very good 
15 trial lawyer, one of the better ones in Idaho, and he 
16 said that in the course of a trial, there is usually 
17 something that occurs, probably that seems to be 
18 insignificant, but as you analyze it, it really 
19 determines what really is the case. 
20 And so since then, I have sort of paid 
21 attention to that, and I think there's such a thing in 
22 this case, and I'm going to start with this. This is 
23 the motorcycle. It's the pre-accident motorcycle. You 
24 listened to all the witnesses testify that, as far as 
25 they knew, this was an identical representation of the 
cn 
there a'difference betkeen the kens6 piate on the 
ground and the license plate on the motorcycle? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
And when you get in the jury room and 
you look at these photographs, you will see that there 
is an acorn nut missing from the license plate and you 
will notice that that nut is missing on the bottom 
left. And you'll notice that in the photograph of the 
license plate on the ground at the scene, that nut 
that's missing is the upper right. What does that 
signify? What does that mean? 
I f  you look at this -- let me try and 
explain it as best I can. When it was first 
photographed, as I understand it, it was face down, the 
numbers were face down. That license Plate was 
originall part of a - there was a bracket that is 
part o f t  \ e unit that fits the taillight, the taillight 
rl J I  
housing, and there is a piece of steel that fits on 
the --that would fit on the back of the license plate 
which supports and provides protection and support to 
the license plate. 
We all know how flimsy license plates 
. . 
are. But this piece of steel encapsulates the license 
plate, and it is that piece of steel to which these 
bolts that I've indicated to you from the other 
photograph, that's mounted to the bracket that is part 
of that taillight housing, and that's what attaches 
them all together. 
It's obvious that that license plate was 
broken, I t  was broken away from the taillight. WeU, 
when did that occur? I t  did not occur when this 
accident happened. I t  occurred sometime prior to that. 
It occurred sometime between August 16 when that 
photograph was taken and the time of the accident, 
And then let me bring you back to Scott 
Paulson's testimony. Scott Paulson testified that he 
and Mr. Cox were together and they had a run-in with 
another guy on a motorcycle, They took their 
motorcycle and chased that guy down, cornered him, and 
there was an altercation. He testified that there was 
damage done to the motorcycles. He testified there was 
damage done to Mr. Cox's motorcycle. He testified 
C? 
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1 there was a dent in the fuel tank. He did not testify 
2 that there was damage done to the taillight, but it 
3 certainly could have occurred then. But, ladies and 
4 gentlemen, it occurred sometime between when that 
5 photograph was taken and the accident because the bolts 
6 are changed. 
7 I f  you'll remember the testimony of all 
8 the witnesses -- well, most of the witnesses anyway -- 
9 there is no lens glass from the taillight on the ground 
10 or anywhere at the scene of the accident. I f  you look 
11 at the metal, and they describe i t  as being pot metal, 
12 probably is, but that is a large piece of metal that 
13 houses that taillight. None of that metal was found. 
14 Officer Evans testified he searched for hours trying to 
15 find it. He didn't find it. Why didn't he find it? 
16 The license plate was there. That taillight and that 
17 housing was not there. There was not a taillight on 
18 the Cox motorcycle that night. 
19 I don't know when the damage to it 
20 occurred, It certainly could have occurred when Scott 
21 Paulson and he had the altercation with the other guy 
22 on September 20th. I t  could be that they ordered 
23 another one in and it hadn't arrived yet so they hadn't 
24 put it on and they attached the license plate with a 
25 wire or something because he was driving around, But 
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1 the taillight was not there. And as Mr. Freeman 
2 testified, you can't yield to what you can't see. 
3 And if you come back to cause -- see, 
4 that's number seven on the board that the prosecutor 
5 left out -- what was the cause? The cause was no 
6 taillight. He couldn't see it. Mr. Cox was driving. 
7 We know that he had a -19 at the time of the accident. 
8 Was that a contributor, the fact that he was driving 
9 out there without a taillight? I n  my judgment, 
10 certainly. 
11 Ladies and gentlemen, reasonable doubt 
12 has been shown. There is reasonable doubt in this 
13 case. I recognize, and Mr. McKay and his family 
14 recognize, how tragic and unfortunate this situation 
15 is. But, ladies and gentlemen, it was an accident. 
16 I ask you to return a verdict of not 
17 guilty because the State has not met its burden of 
18 proof, and the only way justice will be accomplished in 
19 this case is by a return of not guilty. 
20 Again, I thank you so much for your 
21 attention. for vour time that vou've soent. that vou've 
22 given in considering this matter. Think you veh much. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harris. 
MS, BOND: The State in this case had no 
intention of leaving out number seven --this is why we 
get the last word here -- because number seven is all 
about Ted Cox. That's what this case is about. That's 
what we're going to focus on here once again in our 
rebuttal is number seven. It sums it all up because 
Mr. Harris didn't give you the whole picture either. 
Let's put it down here in totality. And 
the defendant's, which is Mr. McKay, operation of the 
motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox, a human 
being. He did cause the death of Ted Cox. That's 
exactly what this case is about. I'm glad he pointed 
that out for me because that is the most important 
element exactly, dead on. 
Ted Cox had a life and he had a family 
and he deserved to live. He was killed by a driver 
that was under the influence of alcohol. You heard it, 
this is an accident. This is no accident. This is 
willful conduct, 
We should rely on the testimony of an 
expert who hasn't had any updated training for fourteen 
years, who is paid a large amount of money to come up 
with a theory that fits for Mr, McKay, an expert that 
didn't come up with any numbers, didn't do computations 
for you, an expert whose attention to detail is quite 
KC 
evident from the affidavit, that's who we're supposed 
to rely on? 
And for some reason, he knew there was 
no taillight? Whose fault is it that that taillight's 
gone? The car hits it full speed, almost 70 miles per 
hour, and it's gone and that's Ted's fault? There was 
a screw found by Ed Robertson and the other mechanic in 
the fender with a piece of pot metal on it with a fresh 
break. Remember that testimony. Remember that 
testimony because that's important, A fresh break, pot 
metal, explodes, a huge crash, lots of power, That was 
not Ted's fault. Ted was not driving the Cadillac. 
Mr. McKay was driving the Cadillac. He was driving the 
Cadillac after he had drinks and he was driving fast. 
This is also what this case is about. 
It's about the obvious. Well, they didn't do an 
autopsy, Let's take a look at this. It's real small 
here, but not really when you get this picture. You 
will see this right here. That's what's left of 
Mr. Cox. That's a piece of brain matter that's along 
the highway. Let's not look at the obvious. Let's 
look at the little tiny detail. 
They're asking you to speculate that 
there's no taillight so there's no responsibility here. 
Do we want to decide this case based on soeculation or 
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do we want to decide this case based on fact, a fact 
like depicted here, a fact like brain matter, a fact 
like a license plate shoved all the way into this 
motorcycle that Tony had to pull out of there, facts 
like a gouge mark, which is a mark, it's a mark prior 
to 83 feet? 
We're trying to manipulate the facts 
here, manipulating the information? Every one of the 
State's ex eits had numbers, they had credentials. 
They do ti! is work currently. They are up to date. 
They teach others. They have a law enforcement 
background and training and it's current, 
He has an expert that says it's police 
policy to seize vehicles, which both officers said it's 
not the case, They don't keep these vehicles unless 
requested by the prosecutor's office. 
And intent, a d  and intent. Another 
good point made by Mr. Harris because the act here, the 
act of how he drove that vehicle, running off the road 
out of control, coming back onto the road at a high 
rate of speed. Sure, the car's a good car. I t  could 
have made it, but the driver wasn't capable. The 
driver was impaired. Reckless conduct slamming into 
the back of Ted Cox. The act itself is indicative of 
what the intent was, Mr. McKay made the choices here. 
c7 
punished. And in this case, a .IS is quite indicative 
of over the legal limit. 
Number seven is the crux of this case 
because Ted Cox is the one that paid the price here. 
The State is going to ask you to return a guilty 
verdict for Mr. McKay. Thank you. 
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1 He made the choices to drink and drive and drive fast, 
2 not Ted Cox. 
3 I want to address Steve Woods again once 
4 more. Steve Woods was looking at the motorcycles -- 
5 this is his testimony -- and when he looked up, he saw 
6 the car halfway into his lane. Completely consistent 
7 with the State's theory in this case. 
8 They want you to believe that the 
9 splatters and where the vehicles hit are clear down 
10 here because it lessens the speed, of course, but does 
11 that really make sense? I mean, you saw it right here 
12 In court. Those fluids are not going to fall down if a 
13 car is moving --let me see if I can get it right. 
14 Every second it moves 90 feet if it3 going 60 miles 
15 per hour, That'squite a force. That's quite a push. 
16 It's taking it down the road a way before it dumps it, 
17 and that only makes sense. We saw it happen here in 
18 court with the cup. So really, blowvitating? Who's 
19 blowvitating here? 
20 We want fact, we want the truth because 
21 that's what justice is about, and Ted deserves it. He 
22 deserves the truth and he deserves justice and so does 
23 everybody else in society. I f  somebody takes everybody 
24 else's life on the road into their hands and dares to 
25 go out and drive under the influence, they should be 
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State v. McNairIdaho App.,2005. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Hugh S. McNAIR, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 30109. 
Jan. 10,2005. 
Review Denied March 10,2005. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in a 
jury trial in the District Court, Fourth 
Judicial District, Valley County, George 
David Carey, J., and Henry R. Boomer, 111, 
Magistrate, of misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Lansing, 
J., held that: 
a negligence on part of defendant was 
required element of vehicular manslaughter; 
criminal complaint was not 
jurisdictionally defective for not alleging 
that defendant's failure to maintain his lane 
of travel was product of negligent act or 
omission; and 
Page 1 
48A Automobiles 
-
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(A) In General 
48Ak342 Homicide 
48Ak344 k. Manslaughter. 
Most Cited Cases 
Negligence on part of defendant was 
required element of vehicular manslaughter. 
LC. 6 18-4006, subd. 3(c). 
Statutes 361 Q="181(1) 
361 Statutes 
-
=I Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361 kl80 Intention of Legislature 
361k181 In General 
361k181(1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 -184 
361 Statutes 
-
Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361k180 Intention of Legislature 
361 k184 k. Policy and Purpose 
of Act. Most Cited Cases 
(3J jury instructions were erroneous for not Statutes 361 -208 
requiring finding that defendant was 
negligent before he could be found guilty of - 361 Statutes 
vehicular manslaughter. 361VI Construction and Operation 
361VKA) General Rules of 
Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and 
Vacated and remanded. Intrinsic Aids to Construction 
West Headnotes 361k208 k. Context and Related 
a Automobiles 48A -344 Clauses. Most Cited Cases 
When a court must engage in statutory 
O 2007 Thomsoflest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
- 
Exhibit- !L-.- 
- 
108 P.3d 410 
141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410 
(Cite as: 141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410) 
construction, its duty is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature; in so 
doing, appellate court looks to the context of 
the statutory language in question and the 
public policy behind the statute. 
Statutes 361 -223.2(.5) 
361 Statutes 
-
Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of 
Construction 
361k223 Construction with 
Reference to Other Statutes 
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to 
the Same Subject Matter in General 
361k223.2(.5) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
When an ambiguous statute is part of a 
larger statutory scheme, appellate court not 
only focuses upon the language of the 
ambiguous statute, but appellate court also 
looks at other statutes relating to the same 
subject matter and consider them together in 
order to discern legislative intent; even when 
a statute is not ambiguous on its face, 
judicial construction might nevertheless be 
required to harmonize the statute with other 
legislative enactments on the same subject. 
Statutes 361 -241(1) 
361 Statutes 
-
Construction and Operation 
361VI(B) Particular Classes of 
Statutes 
361k241 Penal Statutes 
361k241(1) k. In General. 
Cited Cases 
When a court must engage in statutory 
construction, appellate court is obligated to 
apply the doctrine of lenity, which requires 
courts to construe ambiguous criminal 
statutes in favor of the accused. 
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a Automobiles 48A -351.1 
48A Automobiles 
-
48AVni Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak35 1 Charging Instrument; 
Summons or Ticket 
48Ak35 1.1 k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Criminal complaint was not jurisdictionally 
defective for not alleging that defendant's 
failure to maintain his lane of travel was 
product of negligent act or omission in 
vehicular manslaughter prosecution; 
although complaint stating that defendant 
slid his vehicle into oncoming northbound 
lane was defective for failure to allege any 
negligence or other culpable mental state, 
both the first and second alternatives in 
complaint that defendant drove carelessly, 
imprudently or inattentively and drove at 
speed greater than was reasonable and 
prudent under conditions made clear 
references to negligence. LC. 6 18-4006, 
subd. 3(c). 
Indictment and Information 210 
-60 
210 Indictment and Information 
-
Requisites and Sufficiency of 
Accusation 
210k58 Subject-Matter of Allegations 
210k60 k. Elements and Incidents 
of Offense in General. Most Cited Cases 
A charging document will be deemed so 
flawed that it fails to confer jurisdiction on 
the court if the facts alleged are not made 
criminal by statute or if the document fails 
to state facts essential to establish the 
offense charged. 
121 Criminal Law 110 6="1032(5) 
1 10 Criminal Law 
-
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141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410 
(Cite as: 141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410) 
1 1 OXXIV Review 
1 1 OXXrV(E) Presentation and 
Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of 
Review 
1 IOXXIV(E)l In General 
1 10k1032 Indictment or 
Information 
110k1032(5) k. Requisites 
and Sufficiency of Accusation. Most Cited 
Cases 
Indictment and Information 210 -193 
210 Indictment and Information 
-
210XIV Waiver of Defects and 
Objections 
210k193 k. Defects and Objections 
Which May Be Cured or Waived. 
Cited Cases 
If an alleged deficiency is raised by a 
defendant before trial or entry of a guilty 
plea, the charging document must state all 
facts essential to establish the charged 
offense; but if the information is not 
challenged until after a verdict or guilty 
plea, it will be liberally construed in favor of 
validity, and a technical deficiency that does 
not prejudice the defendant will not provide 
a basis to set the conviction aside. 
181. Criminal Law 110 -1032(5) 
1 10 Criminal Law 
-
1 1 0XXR Review 
1 1 OXXIV(E) Presentation and 
Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of 
Review 
1 1 OXXIWE) I In General 
110k1032 Indictment or 
Information 
110k1032(5) k. Requisites 
and Sufficiency of Accusation. Most Cited 
Cases 
If the challenge to a charging document is 
tardy, the charging document will be upheld 
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on appeal unless it is so defective that it 
does not, by any fair or reasonable 
construction, charge an offense for which 
the defendant was convicted. 
Automobiles 48A -357(13) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak357 Instructions 
48Ak357(13) k. Homicide. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 48Ak357) 
Jury instructions were erroneous for not 
requiring finding that defendant was 
negligent before he could be found guilty of 
vehicular manslaughter; one instruction told 
jurors that if they found defendant caused 
victim's death by failing to maintain his lane 
of travel while driving, they were required to 
find defendant guilty of vehicular 
manslaughter, but another instruction 
implied that defendant would not be guilty if 
he was not negligent. LC. 6 18-4006, subd. 
3(c). 
JJOJ Criminal Law 110 -822(1) 
1 10 Criminal Law 
-
Trial 
1 lOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k822 Construction and Effect 
of Charge as a Whole 
1 10k822(11 k. In General. 
Cited Cases 
When reviewing jury instructions, appellate 
court asks whether the instructions as a 
whole, and not individually, fairly and 
accurately reflect applicable law. 
Criminal Law 110 -772(1) 
1 10 Criminal Law 
-
O 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
000212 
108 P.3d 410 
141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 
(Cite as: 141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410) 
1 Trial 
1 1 OXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Re~uisites, and Sufficiency 
1 10k772 ~lements and Incidents of 
Offense, and Defenses in General 
110k772(1) k. In General. 
Cited Cases 
A trial court must charge the jury with all 
rules of law material to the determination of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence; therefore, 
the jury must be instructed on all elements 
of the charged offense. 
Criminal Law 110 -778(5) 
1 10 Criminal Law 
-
Trial 
I IOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
1 10k778 Presumptions and Burden 
of Proof 
110k778(5) k. Shifting Burden 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
The omission of an element of the crime 
impermissibly lightens the prosecution's 
burden of proof. 
1131 Criminal Law 110 $==51181.5(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
-
1 1 OXXIV Review 
1 lOXXIV(U> Determination and 
Disposition of Cause 
110k118I .5 Remand in General; 
Vacation 
110k1181.5(1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
When it is not possible to determine whether 
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or 
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court 
must vacate the conviction and remand the 
case for a new trial. 
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appellant. Thomas A. Sullivan argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney 
General; Melissa Nicole Moody, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Melissa Nicole Moody argued. 
LANSING, Judge. 
*264 Appellant Hugh S. McNair was 
convicted of misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter. The issues he raises on 
appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the 
criminal complaint and the jury instructions, 
require that we determine whether 
negligence on the part of the defendant is an 
element of vehicular manslaughter under 
Idaho Code 6 18-4006(31(c). We hold that 
it is and therefore vacate the judgment and 
remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
On the evening of February 9, 2001, Hugh 
S. McNair was driving southbound on 
Highway 55 between McCall and Boise in 
wintry conditions. As he started to 
negotiate a curve, McNair's vehicle crossed 
into the opposite lane and collided head-on 
with another vehicle. Injuries from the 
collision resulted in the death of Reed 
Ostermeier, the passenger in the other 
vehicle. McNair was charged with 
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, 
18-4006(3)(~). 
The second amended complaint, upon which 
McNair went to trial, alleged: 
That the defendant, HUGH S. MCNAIR ... 
did, unlawfully but without malice kill Reed 
Elvin Ostermeier, a human being, by 
operating a motor vehicle ... in the 
commission of an unlawful act or acts, not 
**411 Wiebe & Fouser, Caldwell, for amounting to a felony, without gross 
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negligence, to wit; the defendant was 
driving southbound at said location, 
carelessly, imprudently or inattentively by 
not paying attention and/or at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions or when approaching an 
intersection and curve or failing to observe 
special hazards that may be in existence by 
reasons of weather or highway conditions 
that caused him to apply his brakes, locking 
up his wheels and/or sliding his vehicle into 
the oncoming northbound lane striking the 
vehicle driven by Heidi M. Ostermeier 
killing Reed Elvin Ostermeier. 
All of which is a misdemeanor in violation 
of Idaho Code 18-4006(3)fc), and *265 
**412 against the peace, power and dignity 
of the State of Idaho. 
At trial, the defense theory was that 
McNair's vehicle hit a patch of ice on the 
road as he was entering a curve, which 
caused his vehicle to skid into the other lane 
despite McNair's exercise of due care. 
McNair was nevertheless found guilty by the 
jury. 
McNair's conviction and sentence were 
affirmed by the district court on intermediate 
appeal. On further appeal to this Court, 
McNair argues that (1) the criminal 
complaint was jurisdictionally defective 
because it did not adequately allege that 
McNair was negligen< and (2) the 
magistrate failed to properly instruct the jury 
that negligence is an element of vehicular 
mans~aughter .~  Both of these issues relate 
to the State's allegation that McNair caused 
the victim's death by "sliding his vehicle 
into the oncoming northbound lane striking 
the vehicle driven by Heidi Ostermeier ...." 
Neither that portion of the amended 
complaint nor the related jury instruction 
expressly incorporated an element of 
negligence. 
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FNl. McNair also asserts that the 
magistrate imposed an excessive 
sentence, an issue that we do not 
reach. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Negligence as an Element of Vehicular 
Manslaughter 
JlJ Both McNair's claim that the complaint 
was jurisdictionally defective and his claim 
of error in the jury instructions require that 
we determine whether vehicular 
manslaughter may be a strict liability 
offense or requires some degree of 
negligence. Although the State conceded 
before the district court that negligence is an 
element of the offense, it now argues to the 
contrary. 
On the date of the accident, vehicular 
manslaughter was defined in LC. 6 18- 
4006(3)fc) as follows: 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice. It is of three 
(3) kinds: 
.... 
3. Vehicular-in which the operation of a 
motor vehicle is a significant cause 
contributing to the death because of: 
(a) the commission of an unlawful act, not 
amounting to a felony, with gross 
negligence; or 
(b) the commission of a violation of 
18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) the commission of an unlawful act, not 
amounting to a felony, without gross 
negligence.'NZ 
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FN2. This statute was amended in 
2002 to include a human embryo or 
fetus in the definition of a human 
being. 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 
350 9 2. 
McNair was charged under subpart (c) 
which, on its face, does not include an 
element of negligence, but requires only an 
"unlawful act" that significantly contributes 
to the cause of death. The State contends 
that McNair committed an "unlawful act" 
when his vehicle crossed the center line, and 
even if it occurred without his negligence, 
he is guilty of vehicular manslaughter. 
McNair argues that the Idaho courts have 
interpreted LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c) to include 
an element of negligence and that, if the 
statute is interpreted to create a strict 
liability offense, it would violate the 
constitutional right of due process. 
F X  Presumably, the unlawful act to 
which the State refers is a violation 
of 1.C. 6 6 49-630, 49-631 andlor 
49-637. Implicit in the State's 
argument is the proposition that 
these statutes prohibiting driving to 
the left of the center line create 
criminal liability even if the driver 
was exercising due care. That is a 
proposition that we need not address. 
121r31141 When a court must engage in 
statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 
154.75 P.3d 206.208 (Ct.Apo.2003). In so 
doing, we look to the context of the statutory 
language in question and the public policy 
behind the statute. Id.; State v. Cudd, 137 
Page 6 
Idaho 625. 627. 51 P.3d 439. 441 
(Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute 
is part of a larger statutory scheme, we not 
only focus upon the language of the 
ambiguous statute, but also look at other 
statutes relating to the same *266 **413 
subject matter and consider them together in 
order to discern legislative intent. 
139 Idaho at 154, 75 P.3d at 208: State v. 
Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 632. 51 P.3d 443, 
446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is 
not ambiguous on its face, "judicial 
construction might nevertheless be required 
to harmonize the statute with other 
legislative enactments on the same subject." 
Winter v. State. 117 Idaho 103. 106, 785 
P.2d 667. 670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are 
obligated to apply the doctrine of lenity, 
which requires courts to construe ambiguous 
criminal statutes in favor of the accused. 
State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119. 124. 58 P.3d 
103. 108 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Dewey, 
131 Idaho 846. 848. 965 P.2d 206. 208 
/Ct.App. 1998). 
An analysis of the mental element (if any) 
for vehicular manslaughter under 
4006(3)(c) requires consideration of not 
only the language of that statute, but also of 
two additional statutes. One of those is the 
excusable homicide statute, LC. 6 18-4012, 
which provides: 
Homicide is excusable in the following 
cases: 
1. When committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful 
means, with usual and ordinary caution, and 
without any unlawful intent. 
2. When committed by accident and 
misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any 
sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a 
sudden combat when no undue advantage is 
taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and 
when the killing is not done in a cruel or 
unusual manner. 
O 2007 ThomsonIWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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The other is LC. 6 18-201(3), which 
provides:All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging 
to the following classes: 
.... 
3. Persons who committed the act or made 
the omission charged, through misfortune or 
by accident, when it appears that there was 
not evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence. 
In our view, 6 6 18-4012 and 18-201 
collectively express a legislative intent that 
there is no criminal homicide when a death 
occurs through an accident and entirely 
without any negligence or other culpable 
behavior. 
Although there are no previous Idaho 
decisions directly addressing the issue 
presented here, our interpretation of these 
statutes draws some support fiom two prior 
decisions, State v. Lona, 91 Idaho 436. 423 
P.2d 858 (19672, and Haxforth v. State. 117 
Idaho 189. 786 P.2d 580 (Ct.Avv.1990). In 
Long, the defendant was charged with 
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of 
an automobile under then-existing 
18-4006(2), which was very similar to the 
present LC. 6 18-4006(3).~ Long 
challenged the statute as being 
unconstitutionally vague. In the course of 
addressing that challenge, and ultimately 
upholding the validity of the statute, the 
supremecourt stated: 
operation of a motor vehicle: 
(a) In the commission of an 
unlawful act, not amounting to a 
felony, with gross negligence; or, 
(b) In the commission of a lawful 
act which might produce death, in an 
unlawful manner, and with gross 
negligence; or, 
(c) In the commission of an 
unlawful act, not amounting to a 
felony, without gross negligence; or, 
(d) In the commission of a lawful 
act which might produce death, in an 
unlawful manner, but without gross 
negligence. 
The legislature, classified the crime on the 
basis of whether it was committed "with 
gross negligence"-a felony, or "without 
gross negligence"-an indictable 
m i s d e m e a n ~ r . ~  Such distinction, 
considered in harmony with the provisions 
of LC. 6 18-4012, indicates that the 
legislature intended that only a degree of 
negligence (as that term is defined by 
18-101. subv. 2) less than "gross 
negligence," but of a degree which would 
disclose acts, conduct, or omissions not 
embraced within the excusable homicide 
state, i.e., "when committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing *267 **414 any lawful 
act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary 
caution, ..." would constitute a 
misdemeanor. 
FN5. The same classification exists 
-
under the present statutes. See LC. 
FN4. The statute under consideration 4 18-4007(3_1. 
in Long provided: 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing Lona, 91 Idaho at 442,423 P.2d at 864. 
of a human being, without malice. 
It is of two kinds: In Hmforth, the defendant had attempted to 
1. Voluntary- .... pass another vehicle, at a time when there 
2. Involuntary- ...; or in the was traffic in the oncoming lane. This 
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maneuver, which violated I.C. 6 49-634, 
caused the death of a passenger in an 
oncoming vehicle. The State charged 
Haxforth with misdemeanor vehicular 
manslaughter, alleging not gross negligence 
but ordinary negligence. Following his 
conviction, Haxforth brought a petition for 
post-conviction relief, asserting, among 
other things, that LC. 6 18-201 precluded 
his conviction because even if he was 
negligent, he was not "culpably negligent." 
In rejecting that argument, this Court stated: 
Idaho Code 6 18-201 states that a person is 
incapable of committing a crime if he 
"committed the act ... through misfortune or 
by accident, when it appears that there was 
not evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence." (Emphasis added.) In Statev. 
Long. 91 Idaho 436.443.423 P.2d 858, 865 
(1967) our Supreme Court determined that 
the reference to "culpable negligence" is 
simply a reiteration of the excusable 
homicide standard under I.C. 6 18-4012. It 
does not preclude imposition of criminal 
responsibility for negligence under the 
vehicular manslaughter statute. In essence, 
we understand Long to mean that negligence 
in committing an unlawful act, resulting in 
death, is "culpable negligence." Therefore, 
we conclude that Haxforth is not shielded by 
LC. 6 18-201. 
Haxforth. 117 Idaho at 191. 786 P.2d at 582. 
It is implicit in these comments that 
commission of an act (even if it is unlawful 
under a strict liability statute) that involves 
no negligence at all would not satisfy the 
"culpable negligence" requirement of 
section 18-201 and therefore would not 
support a conviction for vehicular 
manslaughter. 
The State incorrectly contends that the 
above passage shows that the Haxforth 
Court "interpreted any negligence 
requirement in the misdemeanor 
manslaughter statute to require nothing more 
than an unlawful act resulting in death." To 
the contrary, Haxforth says that, "negligence 
in committing an unlawful act" is culpable 
negligence. Id. (emphasis added). 
Having concluded that Idaho law requires a 
culpable mental state of at least simple 
negligence before an individual may be 
convicted of vehicular manslaughter, we 
must determine whether the criminal 
complaint and the jury instructions in 
McNair's case adequately addressed this 
element of the offense. 
FN6. Because we conclude that LC. -
6 6 18-201 and 18-4012 together 
require a culpable mental state of at 
least negligence, we need not address 
McNair's argument that such a 
requirement is mandated by the 
constitutional guarantee of due 
process. 
B. The Criminal Complaint Was Not 
Jurisdictionally Defective 
McNair contends that the criminal 
complaint was insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction upon the court because it did not 
allege that his failure to maintain his lane of 
travel was the product of a negligent act or 
omission and, hence, did not allege all of the 
elements of vehicular manslaughter. The 
State contends that because the charge was a 
misdemeanor, it was not necessary to allege 
the specific facts of the offense. Without 
reaching the State's contention, we conclude 
that the complaint was not jurisdictionally 
defective. 
The second amended complaint identified at 
least three alternative unlawful acts which 
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allegedly were committed by McNair and 
caused the death of the victim: (1) driving 
"carelessly, imprudently or inattentively" 
andor (2) driving "at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions" and/or (3) "sliding his vehicle 
into the oncoming northbound lane." 
McNair does not challenge the sufficiency 
of the allegations with respect to the first 
two of these but contends that, because the 
acts are pleaded in the alternative, the 
omission of any allegation of negligence 
with respect to the third act of sliding into 
the oncoming lane makes the complaint 
insufficient to allege an offense and, hence, 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the 
court. 
**415 268r71181 A charging document will 
be deemed so flawed that it fails to confer 
jurisdiction on the court if the facts alleged 
are not made criminal by statute or if the 
document fails to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged. State v. 
Maver, 139 Idaho 643, 646. 84 P.3d 579, 
582 (Ct.App.2004); State v. Bvinpton. 135 
Idaho 621. 21 P.3d 943 (Ct.A~a.2001). If 
an alleged deficiency is raised by a 
defendant before trial or entry of a guilty 
plea, the charging document must state all 
facts essential to establish the charged 
offense, State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 
165, 168, 75 P.3d 219, 222 (Ct.A~~.2003); 
Bvinpton. 135 Idaho at 623, 21 P.3d at 945; 
but if the information is not challenged until 
after a verdict or guilty plea, "it will be 
liberally construed in favor of validity, and a 
technical deficiency that does not prejudice 
the defendant will not provide a basis to set 
the conviction aside." Halbesleben. 139 
Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222; State v. 
Cahoon. 116 Idaho 399,400,775 P.2d 1241, 
1242 (1989); State v. Robran. 119 Idaho 
285,287. 805 P.2d 491.493 (Ct.App.1991). 
Thus, if the challenge is tardy, the charging 
Page 9 
document will be upheld on appeal "unless 
it is so defective that it does not, by any fair 
or reasonable construction, charge an 
offense for which the defendant was 
convicted." Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 168. 
75 P.3d at 222. See also Robran. 119 Idaho 
at 287. 805 P.2d at 493. 
Because the liberality we use in construing 
the complaint depends upon the timing of 
McNair's claim that it was jurisdictionally 
defective, it is necessary to review the 
relevant procedural history. The State's 
original complaint was amended, and the 
first amended complaint charged that on the 
date in question McNair "did, unlawfully 
but without malice kill Reed Elvin 
Ostermeier, a human being, by operating a 
motor vehicle ... in the commission of an 
unlawful act or acts, not amounting to a 
felony, without gross negligence, wherein, 
his vehicle went into the oncoming lane of 
traffic and struck the [Ostermeier] 
vehicle ...." Shortly afterward, McNair 
moved to dismiss this amended complaint, 
contending that the conduct alleged to have 
constituted the underlying "unlawful act" 
was consistent with lawful operation of a 
motor vehicle. The State then filed the 
second amended complaint that we have 
heretofore quoted. The court minutes from 
the hearing on the motion to dismiss show 
that defense counsel told the court that he 
was satisfied that the second amended 
complaint resolved the objections raised in 
the motion, and the magistrate therefore 
found the motion to dismiss to be moot. 
Now, following McNair's conviction, he 
contends for the first time that the second 
amended complaint was jurisdictionally 
defective. We therefore exercise 
"considerable leeway to imply the necessary 
allegations," Robran, 119 Idaho at 287. 805 
P.2d at 493, and will find the pleading 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction only if it 
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does not "by any fair or reasonable underlying unlawful act and the 
construction, charge the offense for which second alternative was apparently 
the defendant was convicted." Halbesleben, referring to a violation of Idaho's 
139 Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222. basic speed rule, LC. 6 49-654(1). 
McNair points out that, "slidimg his vehicle 
into the oncoming northbound lane" is 
alleged as an independent, alternative 
unlawful act upon which he could be 
convicted for vehicular manslaughter. He 
argues that because the phrase did not 
include an allegation that he was negligent, 
this alternate theory of criminal liability was 
invalid, and that the entire complaint was 
therefore insufficient to allege the offense. 
Having concluded above that a culpable 
mental state of at least negligence is 
required under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c), we 
agree with McNair that the third alternative, 
"and/or sliding his vehicle into the 
oncoming northbound lane," was defective 
for failure to allege any negligence or other 
culpable mental state. It does not follow, 
however, that the amended complaint is 
jurisdictionally insufficient merely because 
the third alternative is infirm. Both the first 
and second alternatives made clear 
references to negligence, by using such 
words and phrases as, "carelessly," 
"imprudently," "inattentively," "not paying 
attention," and "at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the 
FN7 McNair does not conditions." -
challenge"269 **416 the sufficiency of the 
first and second alternatives. Because the 
first two alternatives were sufficient to 
describe an offense, we conclude that the 
second amended complaint as a whole was 
adequate to confer jurisdiction on the court. 
FN7. The first alternative was 
-
apparently referring to inattentive 
driving, I.C. 6 49-1401(3), as the 
C. Jury Instructions 
JYJ We next address McNair's contention 
that the jury instructions were erroneous 
because they did not require a finding that 
McNair was negligent before he could be 
found guilty of vehicular manslaughter 
under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c). 
J 101 r 1 11 11 21 When reviewing jury 
instructions, we ask whether the instructions 
as a whole, and not individually, fairly and 
accurately reflect applicable law. State v. 
Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 743. 69 P.3d 153, 
163 (Ct.Avv.2003); State v. Bowman. 124 
Idaho 936, 942. 866 P.2d 193. 199 
JCt.A~~.1993). A trial court must charge 
the jury with all rules of law material to the 
determination of the defendant's milt or - 
innocence. LC. 6 19-2132(a); State v. 
Fetterlv. 126 Idaho 475. 476. 886 P.2d 780, 
781 (Ct.Apa. 1994). Therefore, the jury 
must be instructed on all elements of the 
charged offense. Halbesleben. 139 Idaho at 
168-69. 75 P.3d at 222-23; State v. Crowe, 
135 Idaho 43, 47. 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 
fCt.Avv.2000). The omission of an element 
of the crime impermissibly lightens the 
prosecution's burden of proof. Id. 
McNair contends that Instruction 3 required 
the jury to convict him even if it found that 
he was not negligent during the events 
leading up to the collision. That instruction 
said: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of 
Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must 
prove each of the following: 
1. On or about February 9,2001 
2. in the state of Idaho 
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3. the defendant Hugh S. NcNair, while 
operating a motor vehicle committed one or 
more of the following acts; 
(a) Inattentive driving; and/or 
(b) Operating his motor vehicle in violation 
of Idaho's Basis Rule; and/or 
(c) Failing to maintain lane of travel. 
4. the defendant's operation of the motor 
vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the 
death of Reed Ostermeier: 
You are further instructed that the unlawful 
act or acts are committed when one or all of 
the following occurred: 
(a) The defendant drove his vehicle 
inattentively, carelessly or imprudently, in 
light of the circumstances then existing; 
and/or 
(b) The defendant drove his motor vehicle in 
violation of Idaho's Basic Rule by driving at 
a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing or by failing to drive at a safe 
and appropriate speed when approaching 
and going around a curve or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions; and/or 
(c) The defendant, while driving his motor 
vehicle, failed to maintain his lane of travel. 
If the state has failed to prove paragraphs 1 
through 4, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty. If you unanimously find that the 
state has proven paragraphs 1 through 4, 
including at least one of the components of 
the unlawful act or acts as stated in 3(a) or 
(b) or (c) beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant guilty of 
vehicular manslaughter. 
This instruction, argues McNair, directed the 
jury to convict him based solely upon his 
failure to maintain his lane of travel, even if 
such failure was not a product of negligence. 
We agree. Application of parts 3(c) and 
4(c) of the instruction required the jury to 
find McNair guilty if the collision was 
Page 11 
caused by McNair's failure to maintain his 
lane of travel, irrespective of negligence or 
other fault. 
The State contends that any deficiency in 
Instruction 3 was cured by Instruction 3A, 
which was based upon LC. 6 18-201 (31, and 
which stated: 
All persons are capable of committing 
crimes, except those belonging to the 
following classes: 
.... 
""417 "270 3. Persons who committed the 
act or made the omission charged, through 
misfortune or by accident, when it appears 
that there was not evil design, intention or 
culpable negligence. 
We are not persuaded that this instruction 
cured the flaw in Instruction 3. The two 
instructions may well have led to jury 
confusion because they contradicted one 
another. Instruction 3 told the jurors that if 
they found McNair caused the victim's death 
by failing to maintain his lane of travel 
while driving, they "must fmd the defendant 
guilty of vehicular manslaughter." 
Instruction 3A, on the other hand, implied 
that McNair would not be guilty if he was 
not negligent. A juror who believed the 
defense theory, that McNair's vehicle left the 
lane of travel but that it was not due to any 
negligence on McNair's part, would be hard- 
pressed to determine what effect to give to 
Instruction 3A when Instruction 3 required a 
guilty verdict. 
1131 The instructions did not preclude the 
jury from finding McNair guilty without any 
finding of negligence or other culpability. 
When it is not possible to determine whether 
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or 
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court 
must vacate the conviction and remand the 
case for a new trial. State v. Luke. 134 
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Idaho 294,301, 1 P.3d 795,802 (2000). 
CONCLUSION 
The second amended complaint in this case 
was sufficient to allege an offense on two of 
the three legal theories alleged, and it 
therefore was sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court. However, the jury 
instructions were deficient because they did 
not require the State to prove a culpable 
mental state amounting to at least simple 
negligence. Therefore, the judgment of 
conviction is vacated and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
Judge G U T I E m Z  and Judge Pro Tem 
BEVAN concur. 
Idaho App.,2005. 
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ennis Benjamin 
2. PETITIONER'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
000223 
Dennis Benjamiil 
ISBA# 41 99 - 'L E d . M  , . . t ? M .  
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. BOX 2772 MAW 2 6 2007 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (f) 
CANYON COUNTY CL.El?ta: 
I3 RAYNE, DEPU'T'( 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SRANE MCKAY, ) 
1 CASE NO. CV07-728C 
Petitioner, 1 
1 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
VS. ) STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT 
Respondent. 1 
1 O R I G I N A L  
On January 19,2007, Shane McKay filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, 
motion for permission to conduct discovery and request that the Court take judicial notice of the 
underlying criminal record. On January 22, Mr. McKay filed a memorandum in support of his 
petition. Mr. McKayalleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a result of 
Attorney Richard Hanis's failure to object to jury instructions that omitted the elements of cause 
and intent, which were at issue in his trial. Mr. McKay further contended that he received 
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DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to Attorney Jason Pintler's failure to raise the jury 
instn~ction error as an issue on appeal. 
The state filed an answer, motion for summary dismissal and objection to discovery. 
Although the state concedes that the Court's instruction to the vehicular manslaughter jury 
instruction deviated from the pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI), it asserts that the 
deviation benefitted Mr. McKay. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. McKay asks the Court to 
deny the state's motion for summary dismissal and, instead, summarily grant Mr. McKay's 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Argument 
1dahb Code 5 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction 
relief, pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal is 
permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact, 
which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Downing v. State, 136 
Idaho 367,371, 33 P.3d 841, 845 (Ct. App. 2001). If such a factual issue is presented, an 
evidentiaiy hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763, 819 P.2d 1159, 
1163 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Mr. McKay has alleged that Attorney Harris failed to object to jury instructions that 
omitted the elements of intent and cause and that, because those elements were at issue, the 
jury's finding of guilt was not surely unattributable to the error. These facts, if resolved in Mr. 
McMay's favor, establish that trial counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable manner and 
that Mr. McKay was prejudiced by that performance. 
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Moreover, the jury instructions given in this case materially deviated from the pattem 
ICJI approved by the Idaho Supreme Court and were improper as a matter of law. The trial 
transcript' establishes that the elements of cause and intent were at issue and, thus, there could be 
no strategic purpose for trial counsel's decislon to inform the Court he did not intend to request 
jury instn~ctions addressing each element of the offense. Accordingly, Mr. McKay is entitled to 
summary disposition of his petition and the Court's order granting him relief. 
1. The state is not entitled to summary dismissal 
The state contends that it is entitled to summary dismissal because the "Court's 
instruction required the state to prove that the defendant's conduct was THE CAUSE of the death 
of Ted Cox," which benefitted Mr. McKay by placing a higher burden on the state than the 
pattem instruction. State's Motion p.2 (emphasis in original). However, a close reading of the 
Court's instruction establishes that it required the state to prove that Mr. McKay's "operation of 
the motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox." Instruction 201A, Exhibit 2 to Dennis 
Benjamin's Affidavit. Contrary to the state's assertion, this instruction neither required the jury 
to conclude that Mr. McKay's conduct was the only cause of the death nor that his conduct was a 
significant cause as required by law. Rather, the instruction permitted the jury to find Mr. 
McKay guilty based on its conclusion that Mr. McKay's conduct contributed to the death. 
Moreover, as argued in Mr. McKay's memorandum in support of his post-conviction 
petition, the Court materially deviated from the ICJI by failing to clarify that Mr. McKay's 
' On Januarv 19.2007. Mr. McKav reauested that the Court take iudicial notice of the 
. , . A 
underlying criminal proceedings. See Attached Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin. For the 
convenience of Court and counsel, Mr. McKav has attached vortions of the underlving criminal 
, w 
proceedings as exhibits to Mr. Benjamin's affidavit. 
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ilnlawful operation of his vehicle caused the death. Pursuant to the pattern ilistr~~ction approved 
by the Idaho Supreme Court, a defendant is guilty if the state proves he committed an unlawful 
act by driving while under the influence of alcohol and "the defendant's operation of the motor 
vehicle it2 such z~rzlnwft,l nznnner was a signlficnnt cause contributing to the death." ICJI 703 
(emphasis added). The Court's instruction in this case omitted the phrase "in such unlawful 
manner" and the word "significant." Thus, the jury was permitted to find Mr. McKay guilty if it 
concluded that he committed an unlawful act while operating a vehicle and the operation of the 
vehicle caused a death, regardless of whether it was the unlawful operation of the vehicle that 
caused the death. 
Additionally, the trial transcript demonstrates that the elements of cause and intent were 
at issue. The deceased's blood alcohol level was .19. Exhibit 3 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit, 
p. 556,l. 18-23. There was evidence suggesting the motorcycle ridden by the deceased did not 
have an operational taillight at the time of the collision and was either stopped or traveling at a 
very stow speed. See Exhibit 3 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit, p. 629,l. 1 l top. 632, L. 23; p. 
660,l. 1 I to p. 664,I. 15; p. 704 to p. 16. During a jury instruction conference, Attorney Harris 
indicatedthat the element of cause presented a dilemma in the case but that he did not intend to 
request a jury instruction on cause. Exhibit 1 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit, p. 14-15,], 25-4. 
It was objectively unreasonable to acknowledge that the element of cause was an issue in the case 
and then fail to object to the jury instructions that removed an essential element from the jury's 
consideration. 
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By failing to instruct that Mr. McKay's urzlawful operation of the vehicle was a 
signnificntzt cause of the death, the Court's instruction relieved the state of its burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. McKay's unlawful conduct was the legal cause of the death. 
Although contributory negligence is not a defense to vehicular manslaughter, the deceased's 
conduct is relevant to whether the defendant's culpable conduct was the proximate cause of the 
death. Miller v. State, 513 S.E.2d 27,30-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). A lnotorist cannot yield to 
what he cannot see. State v. Brown, 603 N.W.2d 456,461 (Neb. 1999). In Miller, the defendant 
struck a bicycle with his vehicle and an analysis of his blood revealed a BAC of .17. The trial 
court's re-instruction to the jury was reversible error because it could have lefl the jury with the 
mistaken notion that a defendant's intoxicated driving need only be a cause or an indirect cause 
of the death and could have deprived the defendant of his defense that, even if driving under the 
influence, that conduct was not the proximate cause of the death. Miller, 5 13 S.E.2d at 32. 
Similarly, here, if the deceased's motorcycle was stopped or nearly stopped in the middle 
of the road during the night without a taillight, Mr. McKay could not have seen him regardless of 
whether he was driving under the influence. However, the jury instruction in this case allowed 
the jury to find him guilty if it concluded that he committed a DUI and the operation of his 
vehicle was a cause contributing to the death. 
The state contends that, because Attorney Harris argued in closing that the element of 
cause had not been established, the jury instruction deviation from the pattern instructions did not 
harm Mr. McKay. However, Attorney Hams's closing argument reiterates that cause was at 
issue in the trial and that Mr. McKay was prejudiced by the erroneous jury instruction. 
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Moreover, the state's argument fails to take into account this Court's instruction to the jury 
which stated: 
You must follow all the rules as I explcrin them to you. You may not follow some 
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some 
of the ntles, you are bound to follow them. Ifanyone states a rule or law w e r e n t  
from any I tell you, it is my instrnction that you must follow. 
Jury Instruction No. 201 (Emphasis added); Exhibit 2 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit. 
The state asserts as an affirmative defense that the jury instruction issue could have been 
raised on direct appeal and that Mr. McKay is therefore precluded from addressing the issue in 
post-conviction. However, as argued in Mr. McKay's memorandum in support of his petition, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held in State v. Anderson, - Idaho , P.3d (Ct. App. 
2006), 2006 WL 2974049, review grunted (Jan. 18,2007), that a non-preserved jury instruction 
cannot be raised on appeal even where the instruction constituted fundamental error. Therefore, 
Attorney Hams's deficient performance further prejudiced Mr. McKay by denying him the 
opportunity to have the jury instruction reviewed by the Court of Appeals. 
Alternatively, if Anderson is overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court on review, Mr. 
McKay's evidence demonstrates that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The 
jury instructions in this case relieved the state from its burden to prove every element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt and, thus, violated Mr. McKay's right to due process of law. 
The error therefore rose to the level of fundamental error and could have been raised for the first 
time on appeal. "In the case of ftmdamental error in a criminal case the Supreme Court may 
consider the same even though no objection had been made at the time of trial." See e.g., State v. 
Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251,486 P. 2d 260,262 (1971). 
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The evidence submitted by Mr. McKay demonstrates that he received ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Accordingly, the Court should deny the state's motion 
for sulnmaly dismissal. 
2. Mr. McKav is entitled to summary disposition 
The Court's instruction on the element of cause varied from ICJI 703 by omitting the 
phrase "in such unlawful manner" and the word "significant." By deviating from the pattern 
instructions approved by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court took considerable risk that the 
verdict finding Mr. McKay guilty would be overturned on appeal. See State v. Merwin, 131 
Idaho 642,647, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). Nevertheless, Attorney Harris failed to object to 
the Court's erroneous instn~ction and Attorney Pintler failed to address the error on direct appeal 
Counsels' respective performance was objectively unreasonable and constitutionally deficient as 
a matter of law. 
Additionally, the trial transcript establishes that there was evidence, which could 
rationally lead to a finding in Mr. McKay's favor with respect to the element of cause. 
Therefore, the record in this case establishes that Mr. McKay received ineffective assistance of 
trial and appellate counsel. This Court should summarily grant Mr. McKay's petition for post- 
conviction relief. 
C. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. McKay asks the Court to deny the state's motion for 
summary dismissal and to grant his motion for summary disposition. 
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Respeciiitily submitted t h i s 2  day of March, 2007, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Attorney for Shane McKay 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
b-cl I HEREBY CERTIFY That on t h i e  day of March 2007,I caused a true aid correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be: 
mailed 
__ faxed 
hand delivered 
to: Gearld L. Wolff 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1 1 15 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1 1 15 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
L . M .  P.M. 
MAW 2 8 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B RAYNE, DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 ) CASENO. CV0700728 
DefendanVPetitioner, j 
NOTICE OF FILING 
VS. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who gives the Court 
and Petitioner notice of the filing of two documentary exhibits to refute Petitioner's allegations of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in Petitioner's Cross Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Said documents are certified copies from Supreme Court file number 3 1652, State v. Shane McKav, 
admissible under I.R.E. 803(8), 901,902, 1001, 1003 and 1005. The documents are: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof filed on April 3, 2006 by appellate counsel, Jason 
Pintler - Exhibit "A", and 
NOTICE OF FILING 
OF EXHIBITS - 1 
H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay notfiling.wpd 
2. The Order Granting Motion to Augment and lo Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
Exhibit " B .  
DATED ~hig-y of March, 2007. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Notice of Hearing was personally 
delivered to the Defendant's attornev of record hv 
-, 
mailing said copy to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. B 
2772, Boise, Idaho 83701, on or about the* 
of March, 2007. 
NOTICE OF FILING 
OF EXHIBITS -2 
H:\MOTION.ORD\rnckay notfiling.wpd 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of ldaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
b1 
-. .- ,_ 
,. . , . f ,-.:,7..:- .:L,ci',y? 
8 ' 2  . . : E:,.:. <Oi,!RT 
. . C I ,. 
ORIGINAL 
, . :> 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 6661 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ldaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
SHANE MC KAY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
I CASE NO. 31652 j MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO 
1 SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
) AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT ) THEREOF 
COMES NOW, defendant-appellant Shane McKay, through Jason C. Pintler, 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court pursuant to ldaho 
Appellate Rule 30, for an order augmenting the record in the above-entitled appeal with 
a copy of the following documents: 
2 )  Instructions to the Jury (copy file-stamped Oct. 29, 2004, attached); 
2) Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions (copy file-stamped Oct. 22, 2004, 
attached); 
3) Transcript of the opening arguments of counsel which occurred on Oct. 25, 
2004, (a copy of which is not attached as it has not yet been prepared); 
4) Transcript of the conference on jury instructions which occurred on Oct. 29, 
2004, (a copy of which is not attached as it has not yet been prepared); and 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEF&@fjf$$g? 1 
Fvhihit 
5) Transcript of the closing arguments of counsel which occurred on Oct. 29, 
2004. (a copy of which is not attached as it has not yet been prepared). 
The appellant requests that the record be augmented to include the above 
named items because they are necessary to address issues to be raised on appeal. It 
appears that the district court's jury instruction 201A, the instruction giving the elements 
that the jury must find in order to find Mr. McKay guilty of vehicular manslaughter, are a 
misstatement of the law. Mr. McKay intends to raise as an issue on appeal the question 
of whether his right to due process was violated by the district court's jury instruction. In 
order to properly address this issue, it is necessary that this record include the jury 
instructions as given. In addition, in order to determine whether or not any claimed error 
was invited on the part of Mr. McKay, it is necessary for this Court to review his 
proposed jury instructions and the transcript of the jury instruction conference. 
Furthermore, in order to determine the extent to which the possible misstatement of the 
law affected Mr. McKay's right to a fair trial, it is necessary to review the opening and 
closing arguments of counsel. 
"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate 
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, 
... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed 
to support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d 
754, 759 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). The requested items are currently missing 
from the record on appeal. Unless made part of the record, they will be presumed to 
support the district court's conclusion that the jury instructions given were appropriate. 
In order to overcome this presumption. Shane McKay requests that the requested items 
be made part of the record on appeal. 
Additionally, Shane McKay moves this Court pursuant to I.A.R. 32(c), for an 
order suspending the briefing schedule in the above-entitled appeal until copies of the 
above requested transcripts are made a part of'the record on appeal. Appellate counsel 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THERE060@t?& 
is currently unable to properly review the merits of the case or write a brief on the merits 
without the ability to first review the requested items. Accordingly, counsel requests that 
briefing be suspended pending the Court and counsel's receipt of the requested 
transcripts. Thereafter, counsel can review the items and complete the brief. 
Appellant further requests that the district court clerk forward proper copies of the 
requested items to the State Appellate Public Defender and the Idaho Attorney 
General's Office. 
This motion is not filed to delay the appellate process and is made in good faith. 
It is the belief of the movant that a temporary suspension of the appellate process will 
ultimately expedite this case. 
Counsel for the respondent has not been contacted in regard to the instant 
motion. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2006. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF - Page 3 
000237 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of April, 2006, caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF to be hand 
delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court for: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
DEPUTYAlTORNEYGENERAL 
- -. - . . . . 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE. ID 83720-001 0 
G?/*X 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Legal Secretary 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
S H A M  MC KAY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
) TO AUGMENT AND TO 
) SUSPEND THE BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
1 
NO. 31652 
,!> I// 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 11% ! jl 
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on 
April 3,2006; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the 
transcripts listed below with the District Court Clerk within twenty-eight (28) days from the date 
of this Order, and the District Court Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcripts 
with this Court. Any corrections shall be filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1: 
1. Transcript of the opening arguments of counsel held on October 25,2004. 
2. Transcript of the conference on jury instructions held on October 29,2004. 
1 3. Transcript of the closing arguments of counsel held on October 29,2004. /i ; I/ 
:;I IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appeal record shall include the documents listed I 
~ i i  I 1 /I' jjj below, copies of which were submitted with the Motion, as EXHIBITS: t., 1 1  
r . j  
/! 
, i l  1. Instructions to the Jury, copy file-stamped October 29,2004 I" 
i~ i  111 il: :I! 2. Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions, copy file-stamped October 22,2004. A !I 11; .I: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO SUSPEND THE iii /!i 
'I! 
!I/ BRIEFING SCHEDULE be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and the proceedings in this appeal are j/l i!, , :  .,,
!ii .!/ 
,'> 
1:; 
SUSPENDED until the transcripts listed above are filed with this Court, at which time the due 
,,, 
;/I date for filing Appellant's Brief shall be reset which shall be thirty-five (35) days thereafter. 'I 
i /  11; i(/ 
*I! t,: 
c. ,.ci& on AT* 
Exhibit 
iii 
ORDER GRAN'MNG MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE - Docket No. 31652 j/j 
i ' 
.<$>* =-- 
I- 
111 0043239 !I! r 3j: 
For the Supreme Court 
dl 
-- DATED this& day of April, 2006. 
I! 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
-j&b&wT 
Stephen k. Kenyon, Clerk 
I,  Stephen W. Kenyon. Clerk d thB Supreme Cwrt. 
of the State of ldahb, do hereby cefiqcFrth 
above !s a true and correct copy of the&o~"nd~ 
entered ~n the a W  entitled cow and IWW on 
record in my onm. 3/25 /07  WITNESS my hand and the Seal d tMs Court- 
I 
1 
I 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE - Docket No. 3 1652 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: REANE J. HOFF DATE: May 21,2007 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 COURT MINUTE 
Petitioner, CASE NO: CV2007-728°C 
) 
vs. ) TIME: 3:30 P.M. 
) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) REPORTED BY: Carole Waiden 
) 
Respondent 1 DCRT3 (4:'lO-5:OO) 
) 
This having been the time heretofore set for motion for summary disposition 
and motion for summary judgment in the above entitled matter, the petitioner was not 
personally present in court, but was represented by counsel, Mr. Dennis Benjamin and 
the State was represented by counsel Mr. Gearld L. Wolff, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
for Canyon County. 
The Court reviewed prior proceedings, noted the State's motion for summary 
disposition, the petitioner's motion for summary judgment and instructed the State to 
proceed with oral argument. 
Mr. Woiff presented argument to the Court in support of the motion for summary 
disposition. 
COURT MINUTES 
May 21,2007 
Page 1 
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Mr. Benjamin responded with argument, requested the Court grant summary 
disposition as to the petition and deny the motion on behalf of the State. 
Mr. Wolff responded with further argument. 
Mr. Benjamin concluded with further argument. 
The Court announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court 
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, the Petition only raised a 
question of law, therefore, summary disposition is appropriate. The Court found no 
error in the failure of Mr. Harris to object to the instruction and if there was an error it 
was to the benefit of the defendant, so it could not be said on the narrow issue that 
counsel was ineffective. The Court denied the petition for post conviction relief and 
granted the State's motion for summary dismissal. 
The Court instructed the State to prepare an order denying post conviction and 
granting summary dismissal and the Court would hold the same for five (5) days for any 
objection to the verbiage. The Court further instructed the Court Reporter to prepare a 
transcript of the proceedings for appeal purposes. 
- b'/ & Uhl C L  
!3eputa/ Clerk 
COURT MINUTES 
May 21,2007 
Page 2 
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Dennis Benjamin 
ISBA# 4199 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
JUN O 1 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
% "" 
Attorneys for the Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 
'Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
No. CV-0700728 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
O R I G I N A L  
Shane McKay asks this Court for an Order Granting Relief from Judgment. This motion 
is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) because there has been an unintentional misrepresentation 
of fact by an adverse party. 
During the motion hearing on May 21,2007, the Respondent represented to the Court that 
the analysis of Ted Cox's blood had been misinterpreted at the time of the criminal trial and that 
his blood alcohol concentration was actually .OO and not .19 as previously believed. That, 
however, is not the case. In fact, the ".I9 RESULT" noted on the Mercy Medical Center 
Laboratory Report could mean either .19 milligrams per deciliter of blood was found in Mr. 
Cox's blood (in which case the BAC would be .00) or it could mean that .19 grams per deciliter 
1 * PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
of blood was found (in which case the BAC would be .19). Further, during the deposition of Dr. 
Thomas M. Donndelinger, M.D., the Director of Laboratory at Mercy Medical Center, taken in 
the case of Sorensen and Cox v. McKay, et al., Canyon Co. CV-04-10959, he stated that he had 
spoken to Kathy Higgins, the technician who performed the blood test and the one who made the 
".I9 RESULT" notation on the lab report. Ms. Higgins told Dr. Donndelinger that the .19 result 
meant .19% blood alcohol concentration, not .00. Deposition of Thomas M. Donndelinger, pg. 
34, in. 14 - pg. 35, in. 14. 
A true and correct cow of Dr. Donndelinger's deposition is attached as Exhibit A hereto. 
. . - 
s r  
Respectfully submitted this 3L day of May 2007. 
Dennis Benjamin I 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2 PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
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, , 4 ,  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on M a d Z O O 7 ,  I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be 
mailed 
- 
hand delivered 
- faxed 
to: Gearld L. Wolff 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
11 15 Albany 
Caldwell. ID 83605 
kt% 
Dennis Benjamin 
3 PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
00.0245 
MARY KATHRYN SORENSEN and 
PATRICIA COX, 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
\ 
8 ,  , . 
I 
vs . ) Case No. CV 04-10959 
SHANE EDWARD McKAY, 
) 
DAVID McKAY and VIVIAN McKAY, 
) 
) 
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' 1' . , P R O C E E D I N G S  
2 
3 (Deposition Exhibit Nos. 1 through 7 
4 were marked for identification.) 
5 
6 THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER, 
7 a witness having been first duly sworn to tell the 
8 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, was 
9 examined and testified as follows: 
1 0  
11 EXAMJNATION 
12  BY MS. BRIZEE: 
1 3  Q. Doctor, would you please state your full name 
1 4  and your business address for our record. 
1 5  A. Thomas M. Donndelinger, 
1 6  D-0-N-N-D-E-L-I-N-G-E-R, 1512 12th Avenue Road, Nampa, 
1 7  Idaho 83686. 
15 MS. BRIZEE: And, Counsel, can we have the same 
1 9  stipuiation, that this deposition is taken pursuant to 
20 proper notice, and that it will be taken in accordance 
2 1  with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure? 
22 MR. HELFRICH: Yes. 
23 Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) Dr. Donndelinger, what is 
24 your official title here at Mercy Medical Center? 
2 5 A. Director of Laboratory. 
Page 4 
1 Q. And how long have you been here? 
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1 I just like to mark these and show these to 
2 people to make sure they have an understanding that the 
3 notice of deposition was duces tecum, which means to 
4 bring all documents -- 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. --with them. 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And have you brought with you today all 
9 documentation relative to this October 5, 2003 blood 
1 0  draw on Ted Cox? 
11 A. That's correct. 
1 2  Q. Let me ask you before we get into the 
1 3  documents, so that I can have an understanding of what 
1 4  we're talking about once we get there: Can you walk me 
1 5  through what happens when a blood specimen comes to your 
1 6  lab for an alcohol evaluation? 
1 7  Just walk me through the steps of what 
1 8  happens. 
19  A. Okay. The blood specimen is obtained from the 
20 individual. The individual is identified on a label on 
2 1  the tube. There are requests that are generated into 
22 finding what laboratory tests are to be done on the 
23  sample. And from that accession, it goes into the 
24 appropriate department in the laboratory, in this case, 
25  chemistry. 
Page 6 
2 A. Since 1973. 
3 Q. How long have you been the director? 
4 A. Intermittently most of the time. But it gets 
6 here, Dr. Druler. 
7 Q. So for how long -- you're the medical director 
8 right now; correct? 
So the specimen comes to the lab, and it's 
0 individual drawing the tube. 
As far as the Ted Cox blood specimen, do we 
' .  , . 
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2 (Pages- 8 to-11) 
1 it bedn discarded? 
2 A. We no longer have any of the specimen left, 
3 and after the storage cycle, it's discarded -- 
4 incinerated. 
5 Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) So there is some period for 
6 which these specimens are stored, is what you're saying, 
7 and then they are incinerated? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. For what period are these specimens typically 
1 0  stored? 
11 A. I'd have to re-check. It's in the range of a 
1 2  week. 
1 3  Q. So it's not something that's stored for 
1 4  months? 
1 5  A. No. 
1 6  Q. I'm assuming if somebody requests that you 
1 7  store it longer, you have that capability? 
1 8  A. Yes. 
1 9  Q. Have we looked to see if we have any of this 
2 0 specimen still stored with us? 
2 1  A. Yes. 
22 Q. And we do not? 
23 A. No. 
2 4 Q. When the specimen comes in, you said there are 
2 5 some requests that are generated, and those requests 
Page 8 
1 would be what testing is being requested on the 
2 specimen? 
3 A. From the ordering end. Who is ordering it, 
4 usually a physician, and what tests are they requesting. 
5 Q. Have we looked for an order sheet on this 
6 particular specimen? 
7 A. No - I mean, yes. We no longer have records 
8 that go back that far. 
9 Q. Okay. Does the specimen get logged in any 
1 0  kind of a log book? 
11 A. With a written record, no. These are all 
1 2  entered in the laboratory computer or information 
13  system. 
1 4  Q. Then you said -- I believe you said after the 
1 5  accession -- is that the same as after receipt? 
1 6  A. Yes. 
1 7  Q. -- the specimen is given to the appropriate 
1 8  department for analysis, which I'm assuming depends on 
1 9  what tests have been ordered; is that correct? 
20 A. That's correct. 
2 1  Q. And in this case, for a blood alcohol 
22 analysis, it would go to chemistry? 
23 A. Right. 
24 Q. In this case -- Dr. Donndelinger, I'm going to 
2 5 hand you what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 3, 
Page 9 
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1 and I'm going to hand you what's been marked as Exhibit 
2 4. 
3 Just to clarify, because there is, I believe, 
4 an indication in our record that -- from the coroner's 
5 report that both urine and blood were drawn on Mr. Cox. 
6 And I'd like to know -- you're going to have to educate 
7 me here -- what number is this, Doctor? Number 3. 
8 A. 3 and4. 
9 Q. Is 3 an analysis of blood or urine or both? 
1 0  A. It's an analysis of urine. 
11 Q. But the analysis of the urine did not include 
1 2  any kind of alcohol analysis; correct? 
1 3  A. That's correct. 
1 4  MR. HELFRICH: Excuse me, Counsel, could I see 3? 
1 5  MS. BRIZEE: Sure. 
1 6  MR. HELFRICH: Thanks. 
1 7  Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) Let's go back to 3 forjust a 
18  second, and then we can he done with it. 
1 9  Is there any indication on 3 that Mr. Cox had 
2 0 any drugs or medication in his urine? 
2 1 A. No, there's not. 
22 Q. So let's just talk from here on out on the 
23  blood specimen. I just wanted to clarify that there 
2 4 were two specimens, but we're really here to talk about 
2 5 the blood specimen. 
Page 1 0  
1 So the blood specimen would go to chemistry? 
2 A. That's correct. 
3 Q. And then it would be centrifuged. And the 
4 purpose of centrifuging is to separate the serum? 
5 A. From the cells. 
6 Q. From the cells. Okay. 
7 So in centrifuging the serum is separated, and 
8 then I believe you said a designated amount is put into 
9 the automated analyzer? 
1 0  A. Yes. 
11 Q. And who designates the amount, or is that 
1 2  really an issue here at all? 
1 3  A. It's not. The amount isn't an issue. The 
1 4  actual measurement of what volume is being analyzed is 
1 5  handled automatically by theinstrument. You have to 
1 6  load a reservoir in the instrument with the patient's 
1 7  name or number identification. So a supply of the 
1 8  patient's serum sample is put into the --into the 
1 9  instrument. 
2 0 Q. And the instrument being the automated 
2 1  analyzer? 
22  A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. Are all automated analyzers the same, or is 
2 4 that the brand name? I mean -- 
2 5 A. No. There are different vendors for automated 
Page 11 
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' 1' cheihiitry equipment. 
2 Q. Do you have the same analyzer today in use in 
3 your lab that you would have in October of '03? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. What kind of analyzer is it? 
6 A. I'd have to re-check the vendor's name. 
7 Q. Okay. Let me ask you this question: Does 
8 this lab -- I'm assuming this lab does analyze blood for 
9 blood alcohol levels, other than for the county coroner? 
1 0  A. Yes. 
11 Q. In what other instances or context does this 
1 2  lab analyze blood for blood alcohol levels? 
1 3  A. Most of those requests come from the emergency 
1 4  room physicians. 
1 5  Q. But a blood specimen from the county coroner 
1 6  would undergo the same process as a blood specimen for 
17 the ER for blood alcohol analysis; correct? 
1 8  A. Yes. 
1 9  Q. All right. Let's go back to the process. So 
2 0 the serum is separated, a designated amount is put into 
2 1  the automated analyzer equipment -- and I guess when 
2 2 we're done, maybe we can have you get the name of 
2 3 that -- 
2 4 A. I can get the name. 
2 5 Q. --for us. 
Page 12 
1 And then you indicated there is a menu to 
2 select which test is to be performed; correct? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. Now, we've never worked in a lab before, but 
5 are there different blood alcohol level tests you can 
6 choose, or are you choosing to have a blood alcohol test 
7 performed? 
8 A. Choosing a blood alcohol test as a category of 
9 analysis, as opposed to a number of different chemical 
1 0  determinations that can be performed. 
11 Q. And then the analyzer -- and then the 
1 2  equipment mns the test; correct? 
1 3  A. That's correct. 
1 4  Q. And then -- and I have a vision that the blood 
1 5  specimen is actually in the machine when it's being 
1 6  tested; is that accurate? 
1 7  A. That's correct. 
1 8  Q. And then the equipment actually displays the 
1 9  results on a screen. Does that mean a computer screen? 
2 0 A. Computer screen. 
21  Q. Is the colnputer part of the automated 
22 analyzer? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And then you press a button, and it prints 
2 5  out? 
Page 13 
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1 A. It prints out, and then the results also get 
2 transferred to the data storage part of the laboratory 
3 computer -- laboratory information system. 
4 Q. So once you have printed out the results, does 
5 that mean it's no longer on that particular computer 
6 that's attached to the automated analyzer? Are the 
7 results stored on that system? 
8 A. No. The results are transferred to the 
9 laboratory information system, and they are stored there 
1 0  in accessible and archival form. 
11 Q. In this particular instance related to 
1 2  Ted Cox's -- the analysis of Ted Cox's blood for a blood 
1 3  alcohol level -- and I'm going to hand you what's -- 
1 4  well, let's go -- I was going to hand you Deposition 
1 5  Exhibit No. 2, but I think your Deposition Exhibit No. 7 
1 6  is more accurate. 
1 7  Actually, before we go there. When a coroner 
1 8  -- when the county coroner brings you a specimen, is 
1 9  Exhibit 4 then what is provided to the county coroner? 
20 A. Yes. 
2 1 Q. However, you have -- and what is that called? 
22 What do you call that in the lab, Exhibit 4? 
2 3 A. Laboratory report. 
24 Q. What is the difference behveen --is there a 
2 5 different name for No. 7 then -- what's been marked as 
Page 1 
1 Deposition Exhibit No. 7, which is what you produced to 
2 us today; correct? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. And here's what I'm getting at: We've had 
5 Exhibit 4 from one source or another for some period of 
6 time. Exhibit No. 7 is a fairly new document that we 
7 have not had -- well, this one in particular have not 
8 had, but for just a few minutes, since you gave it to 
9 us. 
1 0  But Mr. Helfiich's version we've not had. Is 
11 this something -- it looks different. What do you call 
12 this document? 
13 A. Well, this document is the laboratory report 
1 4  on Ted Cox retrieved out of archive in the laboratory 
1 5  infonnation system. I believe the other one is a copy 
1 6  of the report, probably, the coroner's office has. 
17 I don't -- I don't know where -- you know, 
18 offhand, I don't know where you've got that. But in 
1 9  terms of formatting, when these things are printed out, 
2 0 there is a slightly different format the first time the 
2 1 report is generated for the -- for the receiver or 
22 customer. 
23 Q. Well, and that was going to be my next 
24 question. Does No. 4 appear to be the type of report 
2 5 that would be printed for the ordering party? 
Page I! 
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'1 'A: Yes. 1 Q. That would go hack to your earlier comment to 
3 this helps clarify it or not, hut I notice it says, 
4 physician or doctor report on this particular exhibit. 
5 THE WITNESS: That would probably reflect the 
6 coroner as the recipient of that. 
7 Q. (BY MS. BIUZEE) Well, let me ask you this 
8 question -- Mr. Helfrich makes a good point. 8 Q. It has a collection time of 0542, but we know 
9 Is there anything in these records -- I'm 9 the coroner collected this specimen, so I'm assuming 
1 indication of who ordered the report; right, or who 1 A. That's correct. 
.2 ordered the specimen to be analyzed, or would that just 2 Q. But, certainly, you have a received time of 
3 be on the order sheet? 3 0542, which, to me, indicates that's when the specimen 
.4 A. Well, let's see the official one. Oh, the -- 4 came to the lab? 
5 from this, the ordering physician is listed as me. This 5 A. That's when it was -- would be when it was 
6 is -- a lot of the submissions by the coroner's office 
8 by the information system. 
.9 You have to he in a position to be qualified 9 Q. There's another status indication up here; 
10 to make an order. The coroner is not -- is not going to 0 "STATUS: REG REF," what does that mean? 
: 2 test. So that's why we've done it this way. These are 
13 the constraints of the information system. 
1 questions have been raised about Deposition Exhibit No. 1 11/7/06, and a time, which, to me, indicates the time 
2 7, also, what I'm going to refer to as Deposition 2 that this actual report was printed; is that accurate? 
3 Exhibit No. 2, because that's the document that we've 3 I'm looking up here in this -- 
5 some matters surrounding the analysis of this blood 
6 specimen. 
7 I also know that you've talked to either 7 Q. Well, at least the one that you've produced to 
8 Mr. Helfiich or someone from his office and myself. And 8 us today, Exhibit 7, you've printed out today; correct? 
9 what I want to ask you, before we get into what yon have 9 A. Yes. Is that the same as -- 
.O looked for, and what you have found relative to this 1 0  Q. This one was printed out, I believe -- if the 
.1 specimen is: Has any conversation with any attorney 11 run date is the print date -- 8-30-06, I believe at the 
.2 influenced what you did to check into the issues 1 2  request of Mr. Heltiich's office. 
-3  surrounding this blood specimen? 1 3  A. All right. That would compare. 
-4  A. No. Absolutely not. 1 4  Q. Down here in this section there's an entered 
.5 Q. So let's look at this report. And let me just 1 5  time and date entered by lab. And I believe K. Higgins 
.6 start with the issues that have been -- well, actually, 1 6  would be Kathy Higgins? 
.7 let's go through, and I'm going to have you explain some 1 7  A. Yes. 
-8 of this stuff at the top. 1 8  Q. Now, would she be the lab employee who would 
.9 It looks to me from these print outs -- I'm 1 9  have run this blood analysis then? 
! 0 looking at 2, you're looking at 7, I believe they have 2 0 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 
! 1 the same information -- that this specimen came in, it 2 1 Q. Have you talked to Kathy Higgins? 
!2 was entered at 0544. Is that the time that the specimen 2 2  A. Yes. 
! 3 is accepted -- well, no. Order 0542? 2 3 Q. And does she recall running this particular 
!4 A. It was entered on the 5th of October, 1903 -- 2 4 specimen or anything that happened with this specimen? 
! 5 excuse me, 2003. 2 5 A. Not specifically. 
Page 1 9  
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1' 6. 'when you say, "not specifically," that means 1 A. You know, it's in months or years. I don't 
2 there may be some recollection, generally. 2 know. That information is possible, but it's no longer 
Can you tell us what she told you? 
4 A. That's in -- you know, in reference to trying 4 Q. You've looked for it? 
5 A. Yes. 
8 through these work -- you know, these individual data 
However, you know, she did recall, at the 
1 0  time, there was a -- a problem with the results in the 
11 laboratory system. 
12 Q. What exactly did she tell you about these 
these, or how does it actually work? 
1 screen where the results are displayed, or is that a 1 far as I know, there's nobody in charge of the -- you 
2 problem with the transfer of data to the lab's storage 2 know, the notes. 
They are on schedule, and they're stored in 
4 containers. And as they're dated for, you know, the 
5 to the laboratory storage system. 5 periods of time when they're done, and then the period 
6 Q. Okay. So it would be --okay. 6 of time for expiration, you know, periodically those 
7 containers are gone through, and then they're shredded. 
8 Q. Thank you. That explained how these things 
9 are stored. Because I suspect if we go out in the lab 
0 or to some storage area, you would have strips going 
1 back for some period of time? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. But you don't have strips going back to 
9 Q. You must not keep them for very long? 
0 A. You can get a print out of a ship with the 0 A. No. You know, it's probably in terms of a 
1 patient's name, and the calculations, and the results. 
2 Q. And do we have that strip? 2 Q. What does this date up here, last reported 
3 A. No. They are not archived this long. 3 mean? What is that referring to? 
4 Q. So when would that strip have --how long 4 A. You know, since it looks like today's date, it 
5 would that striu have been around? 5 was the last time it was -- there was an inquiry in the 
Associated Reporting, Inc 
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11, my Exhibit No. 2 has a last reported 
3 date of 10-30-04. 
4 A. So that was printed out at a different time. 
5 That's the date when it was printed out of the 
6 information system. 
7 Q. The last date it would have been printed 
8 before this one was printed? 
9 A. Yeah. That's the date that was retrieved out 
0 of the archive. 
1 Q. Do we have any way of trying to figure out who 
2 requested the 10-30-04print out? 
3 A. Not to my knowledge. 
4 Q. What does, "LAST ACT:" indicate? 
5 A. I'm going to -- I thii that is today's date. 
6 It's the last time tliis was requested. 
7 Q. Oh, is yours today's date? 
8 A. Yes. 11/07/06. I just had this printed out, 
9 because I had a copy in my office. 
0 Q. Oh, no. I'm looking at, "LAST ACT: 
1 10/05/03-0548." 
2 A. Oh, that one? 
4 A. That was -- you know, I assume it's the 
SorensenICox v. McKay 
1 Q. Who would be able to address that for us, if 
2 we needed someone? 
3 A. Probably somebody in the information 
4 technology department, or probably the person in the 
5 laboratory responsible for overseeing the computer. 
6 Q. And then down here we have the results; 
7 correct? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. Under results. And we have a 10/05/03-0546, 
.O and we have a .19 result? 
-1 A. That's correct. 
.2 Q. And then we have, alcohol previously reported 
.3 as 0.00 percent? 
.4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. And, again, you have done some investigation 
- 6  into -- well, then we have this edited comment by 
.7 Kathy Higgins. 
- 8  A. Yes. 
-9 Q. Let me ask you this: Did Kathy Higgins have 
! 0 any recollection of why -- well, actually, I'm going to 
! 1 take a step back. 
! 2 What does this mean when somebody edits, where 
:3  there's this edited by statement on a report? 
! 4 A. That would indicate they're correcting a 
5 previous -- last acquisition, or, you h o w  -- I mean, /2 5 previous result. 
Paae 2 4  Paae 2 6  
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1 there are people who can tell you what that means, but 
2 it may be the last time it was printed oul. And I think 
3 that -- does that match yours? 
4 Q. It does. 
5 A. Okay. So it's probably a record of the times 
6 in the past it was accessed for reprinting or 
7 rereporting. 
8 Q. What about this review date of 10/06/03 at 
9 0739? And then it says, "LAB.ARE," or lab something 
1 0  ARE. What does that mean? 
11 A. That was when the results were --oh, let's 
1 2  see. That was probably when the results were last 
1 3  reviewed. 
1 4  Q. Okay. 
1 5  A. They have to be -- before transfer from the 
1 6  automated equipment to archives, they have to be 
17 reviewed. 
1 8  Q. By a supewisor? 
1 9  A. No. Well, that's usually by the person 
2 0 performing it. 
2 1 Q. What does this information down here mean, 
22 10/05/03-0545,0545,0547,0548, and then a 10-06 0500, 
2 3 and then it says, ".BROADCAST." 
24 A. I can't address that. I don't know. 
2 5 That's -- 
Paae 25 
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1 Q. Does the previous -- is this the previous 
2 result then that she would be correcting, is the 0.00 
3 percent? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. And then she has written, "REASON: COMPUTER 
6 DIFFICULTIES!' 
7 And have we already talked about that's the 
8 interfacing between the computer equipment that's part 
9 of the analysis machine interfacing with the lab 
1 0  computer? 
11 A. Yes. 
1 2  Q. Did she give you any more details, as far as 
1 3  her recollection of what happened, or what she did? 
1 4  A. No. No. That's it. And I asked her, you 
1 5  know, is this corrected result a true result? And she 
1 6  assured me it was. 
17  Q. The.197 
1 8  A. That's correct. 
1 9  Q. And down here is the -- it says, "ENT." I'm 
2 0 assuming, you correct me if I'm wrong, that's when she 
2 1  would have entered her edit; is that correct, or what 
22 does that mean? 
23 A. Let's see. That's -- I would assume that's 
24 the time at which the results above were edited. 
2 5  Q. Okay. What does this, "Method: RXLB," mean? 
Paae 27 
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i A. ' That refers to the instrument. That's an 
2 abbreviation for the name on the instrument. 
3 Q. The computer analysis equipment that we use to 
4 analyze the blood serum? 
5 A. Yeah. That's the automated chemistry 
6 equipment. 
7 Q. Is that the same as the automated analyzer? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. And then down here is another entry, 
0 "10105-0544." What does that stand for, "Autodfi"? 
1 A. I can't answer that. I'd have to have it 
2 looked up and explained. These are things that are part 
3 of the print out that leave -- that sort of are data 
4 points for an operation. But what the abbreviation is, 
5 I would have to check with the people in information 
6 technology, or the individual in the laboratory 
7 responsible. 
8 Usually these tbings are - you know, they're 
9 printed on the reports, but they are not the actual 
0 value. So I can't comment on that. But the information 
1 as to exactly what that abbreviation refers to is 
2 available. 
3 Q. So, again, if we wanted more information on 
4 that we need to talk to vour comvuter information 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. And again, these issues were raised, and you 
3 did some investigation to try to fmd out what had 
4 happened with this blood specimen; correct? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q. And you wrote a letter to us on November 1, 
7 '06 explaining, in part, on what your investigation 
8 concluded. 
9 I need to know, what exactly did you do as 
1 0  p a t  of your investigation? We know you talked to 
11 Kathy Higgins. I'm assuming that was part of your 
1 2  investigation? 
1 3  A. That was a part of the initial investigation. 
1 4  Q. Did you talk to any of the computer 
1 5  information people, like Millie? 
1 6  A. No, not at that time. 
1 7  Q. I-Iave you talked to her since then? 
18 A. Yes. 
1 9  Q. In your letter you say a result was hand 
20 entered. What exactly does that mean? 
2 1  A. She recalled the problems with the transfer of 
22 information at that time. And what she related to me 
23 was, that the information system had an update on it, 
24 and if you allowed it to comvlete a calculation. it 
5 systems person? 5 wouldho the calculation twice. It was a quirkbf the 
Page 28 Page 30 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
208.343.4004 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Who is that person? 
3 A. Well, see, there's a group there, and then the 
4 person in the lab is Millie. I'm blocking on her last 
5 name. 
6 Q. Nelly? 
7 A. Millie. 
8 Q. Millie, M-I-L-LI-E? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0  Q. What about under here, there's a method, and 
11 then it says, "RXLA"? 
1 2  A. That's the abbreviation for the automated 
1 3  chemistry equipment. 
1 4  Q. What's the difference between the RXLB and the 
1 5  RXLA? Do you have two different -- 
1 6  A. We have two different ones. And that 
17 particular part of the record -- I can't accurately 
18 answer that. I could obtain the information, but that's 
19 part of the equipment record. 
2 0 Q. Do we know if this particular blood specimen 
2 1 was run inore than once through the automated analyzer? 
22 A. I -- you know, from this, I don't know, you 
23 know. 
24 Q. Well, was Kathy Higgins able to tell you 
2 5 whether or not it had been run twice? 
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1 programming. And because they had identified that, they 
2 modified the operation so the calculation was done by 
3 the technician running the instrument. The error -- the 
4 software error has been corrected. 
5 Q. Let me see if I understand what you've just 
6 told me, because I'm not sure if I do. So let me go 
7 back through it. 
8 A. Let's go through it. Review it. 
9 Q. So what calculation was involved? 
1 0  A. The transfer of -- let's see. In terms of 
11 milligrams per volume, &om that into a percent. 
12 Q. So on my Document No. 2, and your Document No. 
1 3  7, we have a .I9 result. 
1 4  In your letter you indicate that actually 
1 5  means milligrams per -- 
1 6  A. Deciliter. 
1 7  Q. Deciliter? 
1 8  A. Yes. 
1 9  Q. This document, however, does not -- Document 
2 0 No. 2 does not reflect that the .I9 is a milligram per 
21  deciliter; correct? 
22 A. It does not give results. 
23 (Cell phone interruption.) 
24 Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) So explain to me, again, the 
25 calculation. Apparently, there was a software error and 
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'1 a kaiculation was performed twice due to that error; 1 know, there is no normal value for alcohol. The 
2 alcohol -- if you analyze a blood specimen, and you can 
3 A. That's correct. 3 get an alcohol level, that reflects the fact that it has 
4 Q. And it was the calculation -- tell me, again. 4 been ingested. And the reference range that's listed is 
5 A. It was the fact that the calculation was done 
7 operating technician. 
8 Q. Do you mean done twice, as in, it just did the 
9 calculation twice, and you got the result twice? My understanding is, the laws of the State of 
0 Idaho say the legal limit is .08. I don't know what the 
1 tag line is after the .08. Is it milligrams per 
3 A. It's percent. 
4 Q. Percent? Okay. 
So is it possible this .19 result is .19 
7 A. Now, how do you want this answered, because 
8 this is -- you know, one way or the other, you're going 
9 to get the interpretation I had when I interviewed 
0 Kathy Higgins. She said that was correct. 
1 Q. That his blood alcohoi level was .19 percent? 
2 A. Yes. And in preparation for this deposition, 
1 because that's where I lost you. 1 chemistry, told me that this probably was a situation 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
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2 A. The calculation is to change -- this is 
3 milligrams per deciliter -- into a percent. 
4 Q. And when we look at documents, and we see .19, 
5 we look at that and say, that is the blood alcohol level 
6 for Ted Cox? 
7 A. That would be a reasonable conclusion, but the 
8 units are not stated. 
9 Q. Well, they are not stated. So how, on -- if 
1 0  we pulled some lab report out today, and we had a blood 
11 alcohol level, would the units be stated on the lab 
1 2  report? 
1 3  A. Yes. 
1 4  Q. How would they be stated? 
1 5  A. In -- with a percent figure. As -- if you 
1 6  look for the reference range, you know, one column over 
1 7  it says reference. 
1 8  Here, this is result. This is reference 
1 9  (indicating). 
2 0 Q. I'm tracking with you. 
2 1 A. And the reference is not that it's normal, but 
22 it has been referenced to the legal limit. 
2 3 Q. So that reference percentage, you're telling 
2 4 us today, is his blood alcohol level? 
2 5 A. The reference, no. That is the range. You 
Page 33 
2 where the calculation was not done. Now, I'm looking at 
3 this -- you know, I'm getting conflicting information. 
4 Q. That's okay. We're not here to ask you to 
5 answer our questions one way or the other. We're trying 
6 to find out what actually happened, because these issues 
7 have been raised. So let me go hack. 
8 When you talked to Kathy Higgins, then, she 
9 told you the .19 result is .I9 percent? In her opinion, 
1 0  that is an accurate result; correct? 
11 A. When I talked with her, that's what she 
1 2  relayed to me, was, this was -- then it represents a 
13 blood alcohol that's out of the range that's listed. 
1 4  It's into the illegal range, if you will. 
1 5  And when I initially was reflecting this with 
1 6  the phone calls, that was my information. And the 
1 7  fact -- I think I related to both parties in this, in 
1 8  terms of the counsel, the document had some problems 
1 9  with it, because there was a reflection of a correction 
2 0 in it, which tells you, you know, that -- what was being 
2 1 corrected, what was wrong, is this a reliable result? 
22 And with the information I had at that time, 
2 3 you know, I think -- I informed at least one of the 
2 4 counsels that I've considered it a medically reliable 
2 5 result. That it was not -- it had no value as a legal 
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' 1' alcdhoi for criminal purposes. And, you know, because 
2 we do not subscribe -- we are not a forensic laboratory. 
3 And that's the issue here. 
4 Q. Well, let me stop right there, and then let's 
5 go back to this. 
6 But the fact that you don't have forensic by 
7 your name, does that mean that all of your lab results, 
8 day in and day out, are inaccurate? 
9 A. No. 
1 0  Q. I mean, day in and day out, isn't your opinion 
11 that your lab results are accurate? 
1 2  A. That's correct. It is my opinion that they 
1 3  are. 
1 4  Q. And as far as reporting to a physician, for 
15  patient care purposes, this is something -- this . l 9  is 
1 6  something, would it not, that would be reported to a 
1 7  patient's physician and represented to he accurate? 
1 8  A. That's correct. 
1 9  Q. So the issue with forensic -- and we're kind 
2 0 of in the middle, because you talked about, medically 
2 1  it's accurate. For criminal purposes, it's not. We're 
22 not either. We're in the middle in a civil case. 
23 A. Iundersland. 
2 4 Q. But I understand that you're not a forensic 
2 5 lab. But let me ask you this: As far as a hospital lab 
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1 versus a forensic lab, what's the difference? 
2 A. The forensic lab has a chain of evidence on 
3 collection, all the way from the individual who 
4 collected it, through every step of the way -- any time 
5 there was a change of hands. There's an accession into 
6 the forensic laboratory with signatures, dating, and so 
7 on. 
8 And then there was a chain of custody, in 
9 terms of who operated -- who handled the specimen, who 
1 0  ran it, and a check on the results, so that, you know -- 
11 the possibility of people making mistakes along the way 
1 2  because it was handed off to different individuals, it 
1 3  could have been mixed up, something could have gone 
1 4  wrong. 
1 5  So you could -- you have a more reasonable 
1 6  assurance that the results are related to the specimen 
1 7  that was originally drawn. You know, this is the 
18  criminal accuracy that's required. And that's under the 
1 9  designation of forensic lab. 
2 0 Q. But let me ask you this question, because 
2 1 we've kind of veered into chain of custody: This 
22 specimen came in with a name, a date, and the initials 
23 of the individual drawing the specimen; correct? 
2 4 In order for it to be accepted by the lab, I 
2 5 believe you said it had to have these three -- 
Associated Reporting, Inc 
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1 A. No. These -- I'm referring to the usual 
2 medical specimen. Now, we have, in a situation -- we're 
3 offering a service to the coroner's office, and the 
4 system will not allow them, as non-physician's, you 
5 know, ordering tests. So, you know, to handle this, I 
6 agreed to have my name put as the ordering physician any 
7 time they wanted to use this avenue. 
8 They use it in terms of collaring information 
9 on coroner's cases to assist them in determining the 
1 0  cause of death. They've recognized these values -- 
11 laboratory results as having limited value or no value 
1 2  in a legal setting, but it's often useful value in 
1 3  determining the cause of death or understanding the 
1 4  circumstances around that. 
1 5  Q. Let me ask you this question: In your 
1 6  investigation, did you f i d  any indication that the 
1 7  blood that was analyzed and reported as Ted Cox's blood 
1 8  sample was not from Ted Cox? 
1 9  A. I have no indication that it was not from 
2 0 Ted Cox. 
2 1 Q. In your statement in this letter, it says the 
22 calculation -- you say the .19 is milligrams per 
23 deciliter. What is that statement based on, if 
24 Kathy Higgins is telling you it's .I9 percent? 
25 A. Okay. That's based on the subsequent, you 
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1 know, investigation that was done by Millie, who's the 
2 chief of chemistry and also runs the information system. 
3 This was her recollection, because she remembered the 
4 information on the error, the glitch, and the fact that 
5 it was corrected. 
6 Q. So is Millie the same as Amelia Rennaux? 
7 A. Yes. That's her. 
8 Q. So she told you she had a specific 
9 recollection of Ted Cox's blood analysis? 
1 0  A. No. She had a specific recollection of the 
I1 computer problem, not specifically the -- it's the 
1 2  problem -- she had recollection of the problems related 
1 3  to the blood alcohols and the software glitch, as they 
1 4  would apply to Ted Cox's specimen. 
15 As to specific reference -- you know, 
1 6  remembering that particular specimen, no. That 
1 7  statement may he worded so that could be interpreted, 
1 8  but the thing is, that, you know, she remembers that, 
1 9  you know, around that time there was one of those 
2 0 updates, and that this problem came out of it. That is 
2 1  why they had the individual tech during the transition 
2 2 period put in the correction. 
2 3 Q. And that is how I read Millie's statement. I 
4 mean, her statement says that the alcohol testing 
5 performed back in '03 was hand entered as .19 MGDL. 
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1 So that's partly why I asked you at the 1 layer of collection. That's totally unacceptable. 
2 beginning: Okay. Where is that hand entry? Where is 2 There is no -- you know, so at this point -- I 
3 that documentation? 3 mean, all I have to say is, this has no value. And, yon 
4 A. The hand entry is in terms of the calculation 4 know, it was like -- 
5 -- is the calculation with respect to the -- what you 5 Q. But let me ask you this question: But 
6 can do at the interface. That's manual --you know, 6 Kathy Higgins has told yon that she did do the 
7 they had to perform that multiplication manually. 7 calculation. So if you -- 
8 Basically, it's moving the decimal points. 8 A. She told me it was a correct result. I 
9 Q. So her statement is just generally saying, if 9 can't -- you know, in terms of the caiculation, I can't 
0 there was a problem with this specimen, here's, 1 0  address that particular part. She toid me that this 
1 generally, what was going on at this time, and this 11 accepted result reflected the blood alcohol. 
2 could have happened with this specimen? 1 2  Q. So now, unless I'm misinterpreting, and if I 
3 A. That's -- yeah. Her investigation was to give 13 am, then you tell me, but what I'm hearing you say is, 
4 me a more in depth explanation of why that original 1 4  Kathy Higgins, the lab tech who performed this test, is 
5 result had this phrase, previously reported as, or there 15  saying the .l9 result is the percentage? 
.6 was a correction. 1 6  A. That is how I interpreted her reassurance, you 
.7 Q. But from your conversatio~~s with Millie, she 17 know. And that is why, you know, I did make statements, 
8 does not have a specific recollection of what happened 1 8  is that tlds was a medically reliable result. 
9 with Ted Cox's blood sample? 1 9  Q. So if you believe Kathy Higgins, it's a 
0 A. Not as a specific Ted Cox's specimen. It was, 2 0 medically reliable result? 
1 you know, in reference to the date it was done, and the 2 1 A. If, you know -- if we're at that point, yes. 
2 problems that she recalled that were in this area. 22 Q. Have you gone back and talked to Kathy Higgins 
3 Q. Because she has in here a conclusion the 23 again? 
4 calculation was not performed. But from what you're 24 A. No, I have not. 
5 tellmg me then, she doesn't really know that? 2 5 Q. And if I'm hearing you correctly, Millie, 
Page 40 Page 4; 
1 A. Well, that's her conclusion, that it was not 1 Amelia Rennaux, wrote this document based on her 
2 performed, and that made the .I9 --it was --you know, 2 assumptions that the calculation was not done. She has 
3 as she related the information to me, she said the .19 3 no personal knowledge as to whether or not Kathy Higgins 
4 was not -- didn't have the multiplication by 100 to make 4 did or did not do the calculation; is that correct? 
5 it a percent. And so she said that her opinion was that 5 A. That's correct. 
6 the calculation was not perfonned. And that it was 6 Q. Let me ask you this: In order to get -- say 
7 basically -- 7 we have a blood specimen that comes into the lab today. 
8 At that point, I just about lost it, because, 8 We get a result of. 19 mg, milligrams per deciliter. 
9 you know, this is --so I just told her to repeat the 9 How -- is that a result that you have seen come out of 
0 results or get me another specimen. That, you know, I'm 1 0  your computer analysis? 
1 not -- as director here, I am not going to have any 11 I mean, I don't know what that calculatesout 
2 record like this where we have a series of corrections. 12 to be to a percentage. 
3 To me, as director, you know -- in -- the 13 A. No -- well, I think since this occurrence, 
4 reports had gotten into a situation where, from my 1 4  that computer software glitch has been corrected. So, 
5 standpoint, and from being responsible for their 15  you know, you bring in a specimen now, it gets analyzed. 
6 accuracy, I simply had to say, no, I'm not -- you've got 1 6  That transformation from units gets done correctly. 
7 two corrections in this situation, and as far as I'm 17 That pads been corrected. 
8 concerned, nothing of either of these results is worth 18 Q. How -- what I'm trying to get at is: How 
9 anything, from my judgment standpoint. 19 sensitive is your equipment? I mean, .I9 milligrams per 
0 And, you know, I told her, I want it repeated. 
1 Well, we don't have the specimen. So, you know, if I'm 
2 going to say one of these or the other is medically 
3 interpretable -- at that point, no, they're no longer, 
4 because not only was the document questionable initially 
5 because there was a correction, now there's a second 
Page  4 1  
20 deciliter, is your equipment sensitive enough to 
21  actually give you a report of. 19 -- 
22 A. Repeatedly? 
23 Q. -- milligrams per deciliter? 
24 A. Yes. There wili be a small plus or minus on 
25 that. But these instruments, their automated 
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i me~sukements are accurate. 
2 Q. And what do you mean, there would be a small 
3 plus or minus on that? 
4 A. Well, when you go out to several decimal 
5 places beyond that, I'm referring to that part. But for 
6 the most part, the precision of these current generation 
7 of laboratory instruments are -- the numbers you have 
8 are significant numbers. 
9 Q. Let me ask you this question: On the 
1 0  automated analyzer, you said a display will come up on 
11 the computer screen attached to the automated analyzer; 
1 2  correct? 
13 A. Correct. 
1 4  Q. And that's something that the lab tech can 
1 5  look at, and what will the lab tech see on that computer 
1 6  screen? 
1 7  A. She'll -- 
1 8  Q. Will they see a milligram per deciliter, or 
1 9  will they see the percentage calculation? 
2 0 A. They'll see the units, the milligrams per 
2 1  deciliter, or if they've been -- if they're reported on 
22 other units -- the units will be listed. 
23 Q. If we needed to, do we have a way to go back 
24 into your computer information system and try to figure 
25 out what the editing was that was done by Kathy Higgins? 
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1 A. That's an interesting question. 
2 Q. Do you still have the same computers? 
3 A. Yes. I mean, I can't address that. I don't 
4 know how well the things inside the computer are 
5 tracked.' 
6 Q. And in order to figure out what, actually, 
7 Kathy Higgins meant by the things she put in here, we 
8 probably need to talk to Kathy Higgins? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0  Q. I mean, is there some standard in the lab that 
11 if you have a .19 result, and underneath is ALC 
1 2  previously reported as 0.00 percent, that your . l 9  is 
13 actually your percentage? 
1 4  I mean, is there any standard policies for 
1 5  cl~arting and editing? 
1 6  A. No. That particular thing is outside of 
1 7  standard policy to begin with, because there was a 
1 8  correction on there. 
1 9  Q. If you have -- when you have this software 
2 0 glitch that basically did the calculation twice, was the 
2 1 result that you were getting 0.00 percent blood alcohol 
22 levels? 
23  A. No. It would be --let's see. I cannot 
24  address exactly which way it was being done. I think it 
2 5 was, it was going to give a great -- a much greater 
Page  45 
Associated Reporting, Inc 
208.343.4004 
1 number. But 1 don't know. I'm relying on somebody's 
2 information. And I -- you know, that particular point 
3 was, you know, was not something I was questioning. 
4 I was -- when 1 was, you know, trying to get 
5 all the facts to make sure I had all the information, by 
6 involving Millie, it was to address the actual value of 
7 this information, because I had -- you know, I hid a 
8 telephone conversation -- said that -- you know, with 
9 the conversation with Kathy Higgins, that I would 
1 0  consider it medically reliable. 
11 Q. And again, if you believe Kathy Higgins' 
1 2  information to you, you still believe it would be 
1 3  lnedically reliable; correct? 
1 4  A. Well, there has been the subsequent 
1 5  investigation to give a little better definition of what 
1 6  was corrected, because it was -- you know, that's a 
1 7  loose end there. That was, at that time, in talking -- 
1 8  I forget which one of you 1 talked to on the phone about 
1 9  this, but, you know, first of all, there was this 
20 discussion by me that, well, this is an impeachable 
2 1  result because it was corrected. 
2 2 You know, that's -- you want to know why it 
23 was corrected, and what it was corrected from, and, you 
24 know, more details on that. And, you know, so this is 
2 5 why -- you know, I knew this was going to be coming up. 
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/ 1 So when we got into affidavits, it was like, wait a 
2 minute. This is going to nail me down to something that 
3 I don't have, you know. 
4 But I did, over the phone, relate, 1 think, 
5 the information that I thought this was medically 
6 reliable. And then in preparation for the deposition, I 
7 wanted to make sure I had everything covered. And what 
8 it got me to the point was -- you know, I was a bit 
9 furious at the laboratory people for, you know, this 
1 0  thing. I just -- you know, this is, to me -- I'm just 
11 still furious. This sort of thing is intolerable. And 
1 2  it just happens to he on something that is now in civil 
1 3  litigation. 
1 4  Q. Who would we tak to if we wanted to know what 
1 5  this software error did, this double calculation? Would 
16 that be Millie? 
1 7  A. Millie, that's correct. 
1 8  MS. BRIZEE: I believe those are all the questions 
1 9  1 have for you, Doctor. 
20 Mr. Helfrich may have some, and 1 may have 
21  some follow up, but thank you for your time. 
22 MR. HELFRICH: Could we get these two pages marked, 
23 please? 
24 MS. BRIZEE: 1 already have them marked, I think. 
2 5 MR. HELFRICH: Are they? 
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1 Q. We don't know how those issues impacted what 
2 MR. HELFRICH: Yeah. 2 Kathy Higgins was doing; correct? 
3 MS. BRIZEE: Yours just looks a little bit -- you 3 A. Correct. 
4 just have a received stamp. I don't know what this is. 
6 questions for you. 
EXAMINATION 8 A. With that information, to that level, I was - 
9 BY MR. HELFRICH: 9 you know, it was a situation --it's not legally useful. 
1 0  Q. First of all, as you sit here today as the 
1 4  A. No. 
1 5  Q. And the two pages that I put in front of you 
1 6  are your letter to defense counsel -- I don't have the 
1 7  numbers. Could you tell me what those are? 
18  A. Exhibits 5 and 6. 
1 9  Q. So Exhibits 5 and 6 are your letter to defense 
2 0 counsel and some notes that came from your chemistry 
2 1 coordinator, the woman you've referred to as Millie? 1 A. I could conclude to its accuracy with that 
22  A. Yes. 
1 A. It is my understanding -- this is sort of 1 know, we're doing this in deposition, and there may be 
z like -- yes, it's an explanation, but, you know, the 2 more depositions. But the thing is, I made a statement 
3 circumstances in this, and this record of events with a 3 defending that document with that level of information. 
4 correction, and then a re-correction, you know, I 4 And when I find out that there's more information that 
5 just -- I -- this sort of train of information on a 5 wasn't related to me, and I defended that document, I 
6 laboratory result is abominable, and I find it -- you 6 get -- you know, now -- you know, now I feel I can't 
7 know, just, it's intolerable that this sort of thing can 7 defend it if you're giving me additional information 
8 that I didn't have at that time. 
And, you know, this is -- so this is what I And the thing is, you know -- I find here 
1 0  see as an explanation. But the fact that this is going 
11 through two stages of correction, I mean, this is -- I 
1 2  mean, is it -- you know, is this medically reliable, 
13  would I tell a physician to use it? No. You know, give 
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i thai system. So ... 
42 Q. Take your irritation away for a second. 
3 A. So it's like -- 
4 Q. All I want to know is: As we sit here today, 
5 you've talked to Kathy Higgins, and Kathy Higgins has 
6 told you the .19 is the blood alcohol percentage; 
7 correct? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 0. And that it is an accurate result: correct? .
0 A. That's correct. 
1 MS. B m E :  Okay. Those are all the questions I 
2 have. 
3 
4 FWRTHER EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR.HEiLFRICH: 
6 Q. Doctor, just a follow up on that. 
7 You said that you would medically defend it if 
8 that was the only information you had, but you got more 
9 information later? 
0 A. That's correct. 
1 Q. And you can't medically defend it now? 
2 A. No. 
3 MR. HELF'RICH: Thank you. No further questions. 
4 111 
1 Q. We're just speculating; correct? 
2 A. Well, I'm assuming they happened, because I 
3 have to assurne the worst in this case. 
4 Q. Well, but if we assume the best, then it would 
5 be a medically reliable document; correct? 
6 A. If I could rely on Kathy Higgins' information. 
7 MS. BRIZEE: Okay. Those are all the questions I 
8 have. 
9 
.O FURTHER EXAMINATION 
-1 BY MR. HEURICH: 
- 2  Q. Are you prepared to do that today with the 
-3  other information you have? 
-4 A. Do what? 
.5 Q. Rely on Kathy Higgins' information. 
- 6  A. With the additional information? 
.7 Q. With the additional information. 
- 8  A. I mean, I wouldn't even talk about this as 
-9  information anymore. 
! 0 Q. It's not reliable? 
! 1 A. You know, it's -- well, it's just, you're 
!2 looking at it from two steps. I'm looking at it from 
! 3 many steps. And they bring in, you know, things that 
! 4 I'm concerned about that are additional things that, you 
5 Ill /2 5 know, I just -- you know, it's just, I don't -- 1won't 
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1 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
2 BY MS.BRIZEE: 
3 Q. What do you mean by medically defend it? I So at one point I could say something, and as 
4 mean-- 4 a result of that -- 
5 A. Well, just, you know, if a physician asked me, 5 Q. We're only talking about that -- 
6 can I use this information? You know, the patient 6 A. -- you guys are here. 
7 claims he wasn't drinking. He shouldn't be drinking. 7 Q. We're only talking about today. 
With all the information you have today, are 
9 other'? You know, at one level it seems correct, but 9 you prepared to defend it medically today, based on all 
LO then if you find out there's more things -- and it's 
L 1  just not that -- it's not an additional piece of 
-2 information. Now itCs the fact that, okay, there was 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
-4 system that I'm irritated with, and, you know, we get, 4 BY MS. BRIZEE: 
L5 you know, to add in issues, you know. 5 Q. Well, and my final question is: Are you 
L 6 I just -- the thing is, it boils down to the 6 prepared today to take and discard everything 
L7 fact that, simply, at the point where I got the 7 Kathy Higgins says, and tell us that this is 100 percent 
L8 information from Kathy, it seemed as if, to the best of 8 an inaccurate finding? 
- 9  her recollection, I could rely on herjudgment. And 9 A. I'm simply saying, from the initial point of 
? 0 then the other things that start getting introduced into 0 getting information from the report that there was a 
'1 this scenario, are the possibility of at least two more 1 correction from her that she, you know, said was 
!2 errom. 2 reliable, and then we find a series of other things, you 
Z3 Q. But we don't know if those two other errors 3 know, the thing is, I don't -- 
!4 occurred; correct? 4 Q. I mean, do you know? 
'5 A. That's correct. 
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1 Go&, I can't -- you know, if we put the whole thing 
2 together, it's just, this whole thing is worthless. 
3 Q. Well -- 
4 A. If we can rely on Kathy Higgins, yes. If we 
5 have to put in somebody else's information, and we find 
6 out there's flawed software, and then there's a question 
7 about somebody who forgot to do it, that's two more 
8 errors. And then, you know, this gets into -- 
9 Q. Well, but we don't know that she forgot to do 
.O it. I mean, from what she told you, she did do it. 
.1 A. Well, sort of. At this point, you know -- 
.2 Q. We won't know until we talk to Kathy Higgins? 
- 3  A. From my standpoint, taking all these things 
-4 into account -- I mean, this is abomination. You know, 
-5 it's just like, none of this is worth anything. And, 
- 6  you know, I want to take steps to make sure that 
-7 something like this can never occur again. 
-8  And, you know, we just -- you know, you see I 
-9  made reference to -- you know, the thing is, you know, 
! 0 we did this work for the coroner. We're not going to do 
! 1 anything that in any way can allow for mistakes to be 
! 2 incorporated into a report. 
! 3 Q. But you can't sit here today and tell us that 
! 4 you know Kathy Higgins made a mistake? 
! 5 A. No. I can't be certain of anything. 
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1 MS. BREEE: Okay. Those are all the questions I 
2 have. 
3 (The deposition was concluded at 2:45 p.m.) 
4 (Signature requested.) 
5 
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S1eve.n K.  Tdrnan (iSB #I 769) 
JenniPer Kauth Brizee (ISB #5(370) 
TOLMAN, BRlZEE & MARTENS, P.C. 
132 grd Avenue East 
Post Qffios Box 1 296 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1 2 7 6  
Telephone: (208) 733-5566 
Attorney tor Defendants 
OC? 3 0 2006 
CANYC)N COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAVVFOBD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DIGTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY DF CANYON 
* * * * * * I * *  
MARY KATHRYN SORENS-EN and ) 
COX, ) 
1 
Plain-tifis, ) C a s e  No. CV 04- 1 0 9 5 9  
1 
vs. ) 
) NOTICE OF T:&EIN:G 
SHANE EDWARD McKAY,.:DA.VID ) $P,~.sIT;~.~~)u:& . . "  . . . . . . . . . .  TECIJM .OF 
NIcKAY and VIVIAN McKAY, ) -~&~M&s 'M,  . . . . .  D O $ ~ R D E Q ~ & ~ ~ ~ ,  M.D, 
) 
Defendants. ) 
TO: T h ~ m a s  M. Donndelinger, M.D. 
Mercy Medical Center 
1 5  12 1 2Ih A.venue .Rd. 
Narnpa, ID 83686 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WllL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendants will 
take the  deposition upon oral examination of THOMAS M.  DONNDELINGER, M.D., 
before a qualified Court Reporter, on Tuesday, t h e  7th day of November, 2 0 0 6 ,  at 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
OF THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER, M.D., PAGE -1- I 
I . . 
1 the h ~ u r  of 1:00 o'ciook p.m., and continuing thereafter from day to  day until such 
time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at  the Mercy Medtcal Center, 
1512 1Zih Avenue Rd., Nampa, idaho 83686, pursuant to Ruie 30ia) of the idaho 
Rules of Civii Procedure. 
Said deponent is required to bring with him the originals plus one copy of the 
following: 
Any and all documents concerning Ted Cox, Mary Kathryn Sorensen, andlor the 
subject matter of this litigation. The term "document" means and includes any and all 
records, notes, reports, consultations, invoices, analyses, charts, or any other document 
relative to this matter provided to or received by you, whether or not ganerated by you, 
I ~ 
contained within your file or in your possession, as well as all documents relied upon, 
referred Yo orconsulted by you in rendering your opinions in this .matter or generated by 
you. The term "documenP also means and inciudes any kind of written, typewritten, or 
printed material whatsoever, including, but hot limited to, papers, agreements, notes, 
memoranda, correspondence, letters, telegrams, statements, books, reports, studies, 
minutes, records, analyses, surveys, transcriptions, and recordings of which you have any 
knowledge or information, whether in your possession or control or not, reiating to or 
pertaining in any way to the instant subject matter; and inciudes, but without limitation, 
originais, aii file copies, and all other copies, no matter how or by whom prepared, and all 
drafts prepared in connection with such writing, whether used or not. 
DATED this &%y of October, 2006. 
- 
.. , . . . ... . .. . 
. . . . . , . 
. ~ . 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
OF THOMAS M. OONNDELINGER, M.D., PAGE -2- 
I hereby certify that on this *day of October, 2006, 1 delivered a true and 
I 
correct .copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF TAKING DEPO$lTlON DUCES TECUM OF 
! THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER, M.D,, by +acsimile rransrnission and depositing same 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope, addressed t o  the 
Thomas M, Donndelinger, M.D, 
Mercy Medioal Center 
, . 
, . 
15.1 2 12" Avenue Rd., 
Nampa, ID 83B.8.6 
(208) 463-5070 
4 ,  Tim J. Helfrich 
YTURRI ROSE 
P.0, Box 450 
~ruit land, ID 8361 9 
(547) 889-2432 
Associated Reporting, Inc 
161  8 W. Jefferson St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 343-4002 
NOTICE O F  TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
OF T H O M A S  M. DONNDELINGER, M.D., PAGE -3, 
08/31, 26'0'6 VliV 14: 10 FAX 208 7 0  MKC L a b ~ r b t ~ z y  
~ U N  DATB: 0 ~ / 3 0 / 0 6  M&R@X M8DICAL CENTER - XM%F& ZaB**&XVE** PAGE 1. 
RIfN TT&z 0544 S P E C X W  JWZ@EXU 1NQ[ncEY 
R W  US&%: LAEI. C!MTLtE 
SPEC#: 2003 : CH00026U. ORD FOR: 10/05//39-05&2 BX&!&Q ' COW. REQ #+ 003137633 
C O U r  10/05/03-0542 ' m N  :%&i )~m&@XSn;rm, Tboma~ TO 
%CVt 10/05/03-0&4$. . . P(rAtZX-~Xi! . . .  CCOZ: 5 Q  . 
. . . .  
. . .  
PT . XQ: nrr mt: ' o m  ....... ( 2 0 ~ ) 6 6 3 - 5 2 7 1  
0~/31~zo'oii rHu l 4 : l U  FAX Z W ~  ~ ~ ~ " ~ k b o s ~ ~ o s y  
. - , .  
RUN Dn;TE: 0~/30/06 MERCY MEDICAn CEhlTEX - X'4PA L*Pa**LIVE** PAW 2 
R& TIN&: 0944 LAB SPECIMEW XNlXPJW I W T R Y  
RUN USER: LAE.CMILm 
.If* End of Rapart *** 
- -- 
000274; 
BRKBXTV&%TES 
BmZOClAZEPi405  
C C a u N E  
THC5 0 
I 
OPIATE 
I 
PCP 
nwo SCBFEN BOURCE 
I 
I 
I 
, . 
&UN DATE: 10/06/03 xsrcy xsdLc&l canter - ~ u n p s  P M E  1 
PO?t P X :  0830 1512 12 th  Avauc Roed 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Dr. Donndelingei 
O-r. Krone 
Doctor Xcpwt 
I noetor Hcporr 
. .  , 
a m  MTXV ~ o / o B / o 3  nsrcy lr~bdLs.3 cantur - n~g~p)~ PAGE 1 
am z41~1 0830 L512 12th Rvcnue R O W .  
Xampa. ID 83686 
Dr. Danndelinger 
Dr. Kronz 
. . 
I 
4635010 KKC LLbOXbtoXY 
DIAGNOSTIC PATHOLOGY SERVICES, INC, 
Mercy Medical Center 
1512 12" Avenue Road 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
(208) 466-2663. 
Fax: (208) 463-5070 
Thomas M. Donndelinger, M.D. 
Joseph D Kronz, M.D. 
November 1, 2006 
Steven I<. Toman 
Jennifer X, Brizee 
Tolman, Brizee 6r Martens, PC 
122 3" Avenue East 
POBC office BOX 1276 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83302-1276 
Re: Deposition scheduled at Mercy Medical Center on 11/7/05 
In prcparar;ion for the deposition, an internal review by rhe  hemi is try Coordinator 
was performed to try get as accurate detail as possible on the blood alcohol in 
dispute on. Ted Cox. 
The conclusion of this investigation is considered as accurate as possible 
considering che reconstruction necessary. The blood alcohol specimen was brought 
into the laboratory at Mercy Medical Center early in thc morning. The test was sun. 
The result was hand entered at 0.19 mg/dL. The calculation to change it to percent 
was not performed. Results of blood alcohol determinatiobs are normally reported i n  
a percentage, and if that calculation had been done, the result would have been 
0.0%. Ttj.6 noted on the report that these results "should not be used for non- 
medical purposes". R chain of custody is not maintained. 
This resting was done ae a community service for the coronerst oftice due to budget 
constraints. Enclosed is a copy of that summary. Because of the reinterpretation of 
the results, I feel the laboratory report has absolutely no informational value at 
this poinr. I could not recommend its use and no longer can interpret these results 
as either accurate or inaccurate. 
we are discontinuing any community services Lor law enforcement or coroners' work 
in this laboratoxy. 
sincerely, 
Enclosure 
Cc: Tim J. Helfr ich 
Yturzi Rose 
P. 0. Box ?SO 
Pruitxand, Idaho 83619 
11/0112006 WED L2:35 P 4 3 5 0 7 0  NWC Lbborltory 
It appears that due to a program update to thc computcr systcm, that thc alcohol tcsting 
performed back in 2003 on Tcd Cox wns hmd enterod ns 0.19 mddL. The calculation 
was not perfomed, We ~epori  out pcrccntagc and> thcrclbre, thc percentage would bc 
O,O"/o, Thse rcsults should not bc used Tor non-inedioal prirposes. A chain of custody 
is not maintdncd on thcsc spccirne~?~. 
This was discussed with Bill at Canyon Counly Coroner's office im 110/.31/06. 
Anelia Remaux, 
Chemistry Coordinator 
... 
. . .  * 4  PAGE 1 
, . 
SPEC#: 1 0 0 5 : C H 0 0 0 2 6 U  OFD FOR: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3 - 0 5 4 2  STATUS: COMP , "  REQ #:  0 0 1 3 7 6 3 3  
COLL: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3  - 0 5 4 2  --- SUBM DR: D o n n d e l i n g e r ,  T h o m a s  MD 
RECV: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3 - 0 5 4 2  P T  AGE AT COLL: 5 0  
, ,. 
. . . . .  
PT I D :  ATT DR: CLIENT PHONE: ( 2 0 8 ) 4 6 3 - 5 2 7 1  
. . . . . .  . . ,.-. 
ENTERED: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3 - 0 5 4 4  ENTBY:  LAB.XHIGG1 r .. OTHR.DR : 
COLL BY: RCV BY: LAB. KHIGGI :: 
LAST RPTD: 1 1 / 0 7 / 0 6 - 1 3 1 0  WKLD~FN: 
LAST ACT: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3 - 0 5 4 8  BAR C D # : l 2 7 0 5 0  
. . .  
REVIEWED: 1 0 / 0 6 / 0 3 - 0 7 3 9  LAB.ARE 
ORDERED: ALCOHOL PANEL 
QUERIES: . . SOURCE: BLOOD 
COL CATEG: 
TRANSIT S I T E :  ORD S I T E :  MMC 
RCV S I T E :  MMC 
POINT OF TESTING 
PERFORM S I T E  RCV DEFT DATE-TIME USR AT S I T E  
MMC 
RPT AUDIT: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3  0 5 4 5  .BROADCAST 
1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3  0 5 4 5  .BROADCAST 
1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3  0 5 4 7  .BROADCAST 
1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3  0 5 4 8  .BROADCAST 
1 0 / 0 6 / 0 3  0 5 0 0  MMCMRF 
, 1 0 / 3 1 / 0 6  1 0 5 3  MMCSUM LRB 
C o n t i n u e d  on next page . . .  
PAGE 2 
UN TIME: 1311 , . 
WN USE,R : LAB. ARE 
* * *  End of Report ***  
.. - .......... - ...... 
Dennis Benjamin 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, W 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
JUN 0 4 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE McKAY, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
1 CASE NO. CV 07-728C 
1 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
1 
1 
) 
ORIGINAL 
COMES NOW, Shane McKay, and hereby files his Notice of Appeal. As required by 
!AR 17, Mr. McKay states: 
1) He appeals from the District Court's order denying Mr. McKay's motion for summary 
disposition and the order granting the State's motion for summary disposition. 
2) The issue on appeal is whether petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel 
during his criminal case. 
3) This Court has jurisdiction under IAR 1 l(a)(l). 
4) The transcript from the May 21,2007, motion hearing has been requested. 
5 )  The following documents, in addition to those automatically included in the clerk's 
record, should be included: 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
* Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
State's Answer 
State's Motion for Summary Disposition 
Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery 
Petitioner's Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice 
State's Objection to Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery 
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition 
Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and in Support 
of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Filing of Exhibits 
Motion for Relief from Judgment 
6 )  The court reporter has been served with this notice of appeal. 
7) The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record and transcript has not been 
paid because petitioner is requesting that he be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. 
8) Counsel certifies that he has served all persons required to be served by Rule 20. 
T 
DATED THIS @day of ~ u n e  2007. 
Attorney f& Shane ~ c ~ a ~  
2 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.s+ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L 7 a y  of June 2007, I caused a true and correct copy 
7 
of the foregoing document to be 
)( - mailed, by U.S. Mail postage pre-paid 
hand delivered 
- faxed 
to: Gearld Wolff 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1 1 15 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Carole Walden 
Court Reporter 
Canyon County Courthouse 
11 15 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Dennis Benjamin - 
3 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Dennis Benjamin 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McJSAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (0 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE McKAY, 1 
Petitioner, 1 
1 
vs. 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Respondent. 1 
CASE NO. CV 0700728C 
MOTION TO PROCEED ON 
APPEAL IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS AND TO 
APPOINT STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
ORIGINAL 
COMES NOW, Shane McKay, and asks this Court to permit him to proceed on appeal in 
forma pauperis and to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on his appeal 
from the order denying post-conviction relief. Mr. McKay's parents have been paying the legal 
fees associated with the case thus far but the retainer has been depleted and they are not able to 
continue to pay. 
The Court previously appointed Mr. McKay the services of SAPD on direct appeal from 
his criminal conviction. His financial situation has not changed since then. A true and correct 
copy of Mr. McKay's Idaho Department of Correction Trust Fund Statement, which shows a 
1 MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO APPOINT 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
balance of $474.15, is attached hereto. 
'7' 
DATED THIS h a y  of ~ u n e  2007. 
Dennis Benjamin Y 
Attorney for Shane McKay 
2 MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO APPOINT 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this E y  of June 2007, I caused a true and comct copy 
of the foregoing document to be 
r m a i l e d ,  by U.S. Mail portage pre-paid 
- 
hand delivered 
- faxed 
to: Gearld Wolff 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon Co. Coudhouse. 
11 15 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Dennis Benjamin 
3 MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO APPOINT 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MAY & 1 2007 
OFFSTMT S T A. T E 0 F I D A H 0 DATE: 05/16/2007 
DEPARTMENT OF! ~ORRECTIONS TIME: 16 : 29 : 51 
TRUST ' FUND' $TATEMENT. ,,, . , , . " .  . . .  
. . .  . . . . . . .  . , 
. . .  ... .......... . . .  . . - < 
. ,. . . .  ,,. 
. , 
. . . . .  . Doc No: 76318 Name: MCKAY; SHANE". - SAWC~GHSG PRES FACIL 
TIER-C: CELL-1. ' 
Transaction Dates: 04/13 /2007-05/16/2007 Checking Status: ACTIVE 
. . .  Savings Status: ACTIVE 
CHECKING : 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance charges Payments Balance 
95.56 313.91 274.82 56.47 
SAVINGS : 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments halance 
416.06 0.00 1.62 417.68 
-- 
-- CHECKING TRANSACTIONS ==================================================== 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -  
04/16/2007 SA0371587-214 099-COMM SPL 59.32DB 36.24 
04/23/2007 8110372359-226 099-COMM SPL 32.17DB 4.07 
04/25/2007 HQ0372543-017 011-RCPT MO/CC MAIL 150.00 154.07 
04/25/2007 SA0372592-011 070-PHOTO COPY 33373 O.1ODB 153.97 
04/30/2007 SA0373102-185 099-COMM SPL 59.82DB . 94.15 
04/30/2007 SA0373102-186 099-COMM SPL .. 16.96DB 77.19 
04/30/2007 HQ0373143-263 335- 3'12007 INTERE INTEREST 1.62 78 i81' 
04/30/2007 HQ0373144-263 935- 3/2007 INTERE INTEREST 1.62DB 77.19 
05/07/2007 SA0373998-215 099-COMM SPL 59.86DB 17.33 
05/07/2007 SA0374063-008 218-CACHEICLERK APR 'PAY 55.80 73.13 
05/07/2007 HQ0374064-001 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 25.00DB 48.13 
05/07/2007 SA0374075-013 218-ASHTON CITY APR PAY 0.70 48.83 
05/07/2007 SA0374079-008 218-DUBOIS CITY APR PAY 17.10 65.93 
05/07/2007 SA0374083-009 218-F&G TEX CREEK APR PAY 49.60 115.53 
05/14/2007 SA0374864-245 099-COMM SPL 59.06DB 56.47 
--  SAVINGS TRANSACTIONS .................................................. 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -  
04/30/2007 HQ0373145-263 035- 3/2007 INTERE INTEREST 1.62 417.68 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/23/2007 = 
Doc No: 76318 Name: MCKAY, SHANE 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 12/01/2006-05/23/2007 
Beginning Total Total 
Balance Charges Payments 
205.98 1955.74 1754.81 
................................ TRANSACTIONS ========= 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  
12/04/2006 HQ0356547-016 030-12/2006 CI IhC CI INCOME 
12/04/2006 HQ0356548-008 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
12/04/2006 HQ0356549-013 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
12/04/2006 HQ0356550-008 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
12/04/2006 SA0356570-250 099-COMM SPL 
12/07/2006 SA0357080-005 218-H&W ST HOSP. S NOV PAY 
12/07/2006 SA0357084-002 218-TNF IDAHO FALL NOV PAY 
12/11/2006 HQ0357348-012 030-12/2006 CI INC CI INCOME 
12/11/2006 HQ0357349-005 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
12/11/2006 HQ0357351-005 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
12/11/2006 HQ0357352-011 935-12/2006 CI TRA CI TRANS 
12/11/2006 SA0357391-186 099-COMM SPL 
12/11/2006 SA0357451-015 070-PHOTO COPY 31620 
12/11/2006 SA0357453-020 072-METER MAIL 31621 
12/18/2006 9210358219-247 099-COMM SPL 
12/18/2006 HQ0358296-012 061-CK INMATE 31761 
12/26/2006 SA0359085-248 099-COMM SPL 
12/29/2006 HQ0359516-356 335-11/2006 INTERE INTEREST 
12/29/2006 HQ0359517-356 935-11/2006 INTERE INTEREST 
01/02/2007 SA0359590-217 099-COMM SPL 
01/03/2007 HQ0359687-012 030- 1/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
01/03/2007 HQ0359688-005 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
01/03/2007 HQ0359689-010 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
01/03/2007 HQ0359690-005 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
01/03/2007 HQ0359691-011 935- 1/2007 CI TRA CI TRANS 
01/08/2007 SA0360284-239 099-COMM SPL 
01/10/2007 HQ0360657-002 011-RCPT MO/CC MAIL 
01/10/2007 SA0360659-040 072-METER MAIL 32247 
01/10/2007 SAO360664-022 070-PHOTO COPY 32245 
01/10/2007 HQ0360787-011 030- 1/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
01/10/2007 HQ0360788-005 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
01/10/2007 HQ0360790-005 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
01/10/2007 HQ0360791-010 935- 1/2007 CI TRA CI TRANS 
01/15/2007 SA0361076-218 099-COMM SPL 
01/22/2007 SA0361681-211 099-COMM SPL 
01/23/2007 SA0361899-020 072-METER MAIL 32440 
01/29/2007 SA0362534-238 099-COMM SPL 
01/31/2007 HQ0362996-352 335-12/2006 INTERE INTEREST 
01/31/2007 HQ0362997-352 935-12/2006 INTERE INTEREST 
SAWC/GHSG PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-1 
' Current 
Balance 
5.05 
Amount Balance 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -  
63.66 269.64 
8.52DB 261.12 
25.00DB 236.12 
0.39DB 235.73 
73.16DB 162.57 
9.00 171.57 
4.20 175.77 
96.26 272.03 
13.78DB 258.25 
0.39DB 257.86 
2.09DB 255.77 
58.84DB 196.93 
0.40DB 196.53 
0.24DB 196.29 
16.51DB 179.78 
100.00DB 79.78 
59.47DB 20.31 
0.75 21.06 
0.75DB 20.31 
10. OODB 10.31 
176.10 186.41 
35.16DB 151.25 
25.00DB 126.25 
0.39DB 125.86 
35.55DB 90.31 
39.37DB 50.94 
200.00 250.94 
0.24DB 250.70 
0.50DB 250.20 
113.60 363.80 
17.50DB 346.30 
0.39DB 345.91 
15.71DB 330.20 
53.80DB 276.40 
51.64DB 224.76 
0.48DB 224.28 
20.50DB 203.78 
0.93 204.71 
0.93DB 203.78 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/23/2007 = 
Doc No: 76318 Name: MCKAY, SHANE 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 12/01/2006-05/23/2007 
Beginning Total Total 
Balance Charges Payments 
205.98 1955.74 1754.81 
................................ TRANSACTIONS ========= 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  
02/05/2007 SA0363333-235 099-COMM SPL 
02/05/2007 SA0363333-236 099-COMM SPL 
02/05/2007 SA0363376-009 218- FC PARKS & RE JAN PAY 
02/05/2007 HQ0363377-002 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
02/05/2007 SA0363382-008 218-ASHTON MEMORIA JAN PAY 
02/07/2007 HQ0363875-008 030- 2/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
02/07/2007 HQ0363876-005 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
02/07/2007 HQ0363877-008 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
02/07/2007 HQ0363878-005 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
02/12/2007 SA0364357-243 099-COMM SPL 
02/12/2007 SA0364357-244 099-COMM SPL 
02/14/2007 HQ0364688-008 030- 2/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
02/14/2007 HQ0364689-005 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
02/14/2007 HQ0364691-005 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
02/14/2007 HQ0364692-007 935- 2/2007 CI TRA CI TRANS 
02/20/2007 SA0365061-239 099-COMM SPL 
02/26/2007 SA0365776-227 099-COMM SPL 
02/28/2007 HQ0366184-345 335- 1/2007 INTERE INTEREST 
02/28/2007 HQ0366185-345 935- 1/2007 INTERE INTEREST 
03/02/2007 HQ0366531-006 030- 3/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
03/02/2007 HQ0366532-004 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
03/02/2007 HQ0366533-007 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
03/02/2007 HQ0366534-004 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
03/02/2007 HQ0366535-005 935- 3/2007 CI TRA CI TRANS 
03/05/2007 SA0366701-235 099-COMM SPL 
03/06/2007 SA0367040-035 071-MED CO-PAY 2/26/07 
03/12/2007 SA0367599-246 099-COMM SPL 
03/19/2007 SA0368340-218 099-COMM SPL 
03/20/2007 SA0368488-007 071-MED CO-PAY 3/13/07 
03/20/2007 HQ0368494-007 030- 3/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
03/20/2007 HQ0368495-004 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
03/20/2007 HQ0368497-004 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
03/20/2007 HQ0368498-006 935- 3/2007 CI TRA CI TRANS 
03/26/2007 SA0369181-247 099-COMM SPL 
03/30/2007 SA0369738-024 071-MED CO-PAY 03/26/07 
03/30/2007 HQ0369823-342 335- 2/2007 INTERE INTEREST 
03/30/2007 HQ0369824-342 935- 2/2007 INTERE INTEREST 
04/02/2007 SA0369878-213 099-COMM SPL 
04/03/2007 HQ0370094-007 030- 4/2007 CI INC CI INCOME 
SAWC/GHSG PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-1 
Current 
Balance 
5.05 
....................... 
Amount Balance 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -  
47.92DB 155.86 
12.91DB 142.95 
23.85 166.80 
11.93DB 154.87 
0.70 155.57 
53.10 208.67 
7.11DB 201.56 
13.07DB 188.49 
0.39DB 188.10 
59.86DB 128.24 
61.48DB 66.76 
144.94 211.70 
24.83DB 186.87 
0.39DB 186.48 
39.72DB 146.76 
58.90DB 87.86 
59.79DB 28.07 
1.23 29.30 
1.23DB 28.07 
178.03 206.10 
35.33DB 170.77 
25.00DB 145.77 
0.39DB 145.38 
37.31DB 108.07 
38.67DB 69.40 
3.00DB 66.40 
47.18DB 19.22 
12.78DB 6.44 
5.00DB 1.44 
163.00 164.44 
30.81DB 133.63 
0.39DB 133.24 
51.80DB 81.44 
33.74DB 47.70 
7.00DB 40.70 
1.35 42.05 
1.35DB 40.70 
37.16DB 3.54 
175.64 179.18 
= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/23/2007 = 
Doc No: 76318 Name: MCKAY, S W E  
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 12/01/2006-05/23/2007 
Beginning Total Total 
Balance Charges Payments 
205.98 1955.74 1754.81 
................................ TRANSACTIONS ========= 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  
04/03/2007 HQ0370095-004 061-CK INMATE FAMILY SUP 
04/03/2007 HQ0370096-008 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
04/03/2007 HQ0370097-004 078-MET MAIL FAMILY SUP 
04/03/2007 HQ0370098-006 935- 4/2007 CI TRA CI TRANS 
04/03/2007 SA0370112-001 317-CREDIT MED COP FIX#369738 
04/06/2007 SA0370716-007 218-DUBOIS CITY MAR PAY 
04/06/2007 SA0370720-007 218-F7W CAMAS CREE MAR PAY 
04/09/2007 SAO370817-236 099-COMM SPL 
04/12/2007 SA0371346-040 071-MED CO-PAY 4/5/07 
04/16/2007 51-10371587-214 099-COMM SPL 
04/23/2007 SA0372359-226 099-COMM SPL 
04/25/2007 HQ0372543-017 011-RCPT MO/CC MAIL 
04/25/2007 SA0372592-011 070-PHOTO COPY 33373 
04/30/2007 SA0373102-185 099-COMM SPL 
04/30/2007 SA0373102-186 099-COMM SPL 
04/30/2007 HQ0373143-263 335- 3/2007 INTERE INTEREST 
04/30/2007 HQ0373144-263 935- 3/2007 INTERE INTEREST 
05/07/2007 SA0373998-215 099-COMM SPL 
05/07/2007 SA0374063-008 218-CACHE/CLERK APR PAY 
05/07/2007 HQ0374064-001 062-CHILD SUPP 189530 
05/07/2007 SA0374075-013 218-ASHTON CITY APR PAY 
05/07/2007 8210374079-008 218-DUBOIS CITY APR PAY 
05/07/2007 5,40374083-009 218-F&G TEX CREEK APR PAY 
05/14/2007 SA0374864-245 099-COMM SPL 
05/21/2007 5110375764-234 099-COMM SPL 
SAWC/GHSG PRES FACIL 
TIER-C CELL-1 
Current 
Balance 
5.05 
-------------------we--- 
Amount Balance 
- - - - - - - - - -  - ---------.  
34.48DB 144.70 
25.00DB 119.70 
0.39DB 119.31 
35.77DB 83.54 
3.00 86.54 
34.20 120.74 
36.45 157.19 
57.63DB 99.56 
4.00DB 95.56 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Idaho Department of Cwrection 
1 hereby certify that the foregoing i s  a full, true, and 
correct copy of an instrument as the same now remains 
on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand hereto affixed this 
day of A.D., 20& 
DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1 1  15 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
1 JUN 0 52007 I 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 
Defendandpetitioner, 
VS. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
PlaintifflRespondent. 
1 ) CASE NO. CV0700728 
j ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) DISPOSITION AND DENYING 
) PETITIONER'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
1 
\ 
This case came before the Court on May 21,2007, for hearing on Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Disposition under I.C. $19-4896(c) and on Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Disposition. Petitioner was represented by Dennis Benjamin, Attorney at Law. Respondent was 
represented by GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County. Counsel 
for both parties presented oral argument to the Court based upon the prior pleadings, motions and 
exhibits submitted herein. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court placed its Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of law on to the record, determining that there were no genuine issues 
of material fact, only issues as to how the legal issues were to be resolved. 
Based upon the evidencelexhibits, pleadings and arguments, the Court concludes that 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition should be granted, and Petitioner's Cross-Motion 
ORDER 
Ii:iMOT1ONORD\MCKAY 0RD.wpd 
should be denied under the standards applicable through Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The Court finds that Petitioner was benefitted, and not prejudiced, by the jury 
instructions given in the jury trial in CR0321789 and that trial counsel and appellate counsel 
were not constitutionally deficient in their performance. 
THEREFORE, the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition is granted, judgment 
herein is granted to Respondent and the Petition herein is ordered DISMISSED. Petitioner's 
Cross-Motion is hereby DENIED. UUN 0 1 2001, 
DATED This - day of May, 2007. //"la, 
RENAE J. H O F F  ' " "16 
DISTRICT JUDGE '* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 
0h.L 5 day of-kmimy, 2007. 83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this - n 
ORDER 
H:IMoTION,ORD'MCKAY ORD.wpd 
JUN 4 2 2003 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J MEYERS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE McKAY, ) CASE NO. CV 0 7 0 0 7 2 8 ~  
1 
Petitioner, 1 ORDER GRANTING 
1 MOTION TO PROCEED ON 
VS. ) APPEAL IN FORMA 
1 PAUPERIS AND TO 
STATE OF IDAHO, APPOINT STATE 
) APPELLATE PUBLIC 
Respondent. ) DEFENDER 
) 
THE COURT, having considered Shane McKay's motion to permit him to proceed on 
appeal in forma pauperis and to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on 
his appeal, and good-cause appearing therefore, grants the motion and hereby Orders: 
I )  That the costs of proceeding on appeal, including the preparation of the clerk's record 
and transcript be prepared at public expense; 
2) That the State Appellate Public Defender be and hereby is appointed to represent Mr, 
Kay on appeal 
DATED THIS - day of June 2007. 
*. 
Renae J. Hoff 
District Judge 
1 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
AND TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &ay of June 2007, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be 
&mailed, by U.S. Mail postage pre-paid 
- hand delivered 
- faxed 
to: Gearld Wolff 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon Co. Courthouse. 
1 1 15 Albany .- 
Caldwell. ID 83605 
Dennis Benjanlin 
Nevin, Benjaniin, McKay & Bartletl LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise. ID 83701 
Molly Huskey 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln. 
Boise, ID 83703 
2 . ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
AND TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 
1 
Petitioner- 1 Case No. CV-07-oop8'C 
Appellant, 1 
1 CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
-vs- 1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. 1 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the 
following is being sent as an exhibit: 
Presentence Investigation Report (From Case #CR-o3-~178g*C) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this (-0 day of August, 2007. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
the County of canion. 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 1 
1 
Petitioner- 1 
Appellant, 1 Case No. CV-o7-00728*C 
1 
-vs- j CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerlc of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules, including specific documents as requested in the Notice of 
Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affied the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this b day of August, 2007. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
'n and for the County of Canyon. 
B~:&& ew &fl Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SHANE MCKAY, 
Petitioner- 
Appellant, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I 
1 Supreme court NO. 34271 
1 
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I, WILLIAM H. I-IURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows: 
Molly IIusliey, State Appellate Public Defender, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this b day of &"st; 2007. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District ofthe State of Idaho, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
